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A RECONSIDERATION OF COPYRIGHT’S TERM 
Kristelia A. García & Justin McCrary* 
For well over a century, legislators, courts, lawyers, and scholars have spent significant time and energy 
debating the optimal duration of copyright protection. While there is general consensus that copyright’s 
term is of legal and economic significance, arguments both for and against a lengthy term are often 
impressionistic. Utilizing music industry sales data not previously available for academic analysis, this 
Article fills an important evidentiary gap in the literature. Using recorded music as a case study, we 
determine that most copyrighted music earns the majority of its lifetime revenue in the first five to ten years 
following its initial release (and in many cases, far sooner than that). 
 
Our analysis suggests at least two results of interest to legislators, lawyers, and scholars alike. First, it 
contributes to the normative debate around copyright’s incentive–access paradigm by proposing a more 
efficient conception of copyright’s term for information goods: namely, one that replaces the conventional 
“life plus” durational standard with one based on the commercial viability of the average work. Second, 
it demonstrates that advocates’ and legislators’ tendency to focus on atypical works leads to overprotection 
of the average work, suggesting that copyright’s term is not nearly as significant for copyright owners as 
conventional wisdom submits. 
INTRODUCTION 
For well over a century, legislators, courts, lawyers, and scholars have spent 
a significant amount of time and energy debating the optimal duration of cop-
yright protection. Speaking about the dangers of copyright’s monopoly in 1841, 
Thomas Macaulay warned Britain’s House of Commons that “the evil effects 
of the monopoly are proportioned to the length of its duration. But the good 
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effects for the sake of which we bear with the evil effects are by no means 
proportioned to the length of its duration.”1 In his seminal work on copyright—
drafted at the time Congress was considering extending copyright’s term from 
fifty-six years to “life plus fifty”—Justice Stephen Breyer concluded that such 
an extension was not justified because it would not provide any additional in-
centive to authors or publishers.2 
The last legislative effort to address copyright’s term—the Copyright Term 
Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA), popularly known as the Sonny Bono Act—
extended the period of protection to life of the author plus 70 years (or, in the 
case of works made for hire, to 95 years from the date of distribution or 120 
years from the date of creation, whichever comes first).3 While many copyright 
owners have cheered this development—which brought the United States into 
harmony with some of its foreign counterparts under the Berne Convention4—
critics have lamented the potential for waste, inefficiency, and overreach that 
this extended term brings.5 
The historic import of term to copyright law cannot be overstated. For 
example, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court case that considered the con-
stitutionality of the Sonny Bono extension, thirty-five separate amicus briefs 
were filed.6 Notably, most of the arguments for and against a lengthy copyright 
term were impressionistic. Largely due to lack of data, there has been, to date, 
little robust empirical analysis of copyright’s usefulness over time. 
The current term represents a legislative compromise intended to address 
this inherent tension, often referred to as the “incentive–access paradigm.”7 As 
 
1.  Thomas Babington Macaulay, Speech Delivered to the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in PROSE 
AND POETRY 731, 735 (G.M. Young ed., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1970). 
2.  Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer 
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 324–25 (1970). 
3.  Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301–04). 
4.  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 
1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (as revised at Paris July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
5.  See Dennis S. Karjala, Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors in Opposi-
tion to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505, at 16 (Jan. 28, 1998), http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/ 
OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/1998statement.html#page%2016. At the same time, the CTEA cre-
ated disharmony in various ways—e.g., by extending protection of works-for-hire to ninety-five years versus 
the European Union’s seventy. See id. The CTEA is also not reciprocal. See, e.g., William F. Patry, The Copyright 
Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publishers Managed to Steal the Bread from Authors, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 661, 693 (1996). 
6.  For a list of all amicus filings, see OPENLAW: Eldred v. Ashcroft, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR 
INTERNET & SOC’Y, https://cyber.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/legal.html (last visited Sept. 17, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/39GL-4Y8A]. 
7.  For a full explanation of the incentive–access paradigm in copyright, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., 
Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 485 (1996) (“Broadening the scope 
of copyright increases the incentive to produce works of authorship and results in a greater variety of such 
works. Broadening copyright’s scope, however, also limits access to such works both generally, by increasing 
their price, and specifically, by limiting the material that others can use to create additional works. Given these 
competing considerations, defining copyright’s proper scope has become a matter of balancing the benefits 
of broader protection, in the form of increased incentive to produce such works, against its costs, in the form 
of lost access to such works.”). 
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a policy lever, term has long been viewed as key to bridging this divide. Accord-
ing to the incentive theory of copyright, society encourages the production of 
creative works by offering protections designed to result in financial rewards 
for creators.8 Some creation, of course, will take place with or without such 
protections.9 
Because those works’ creators are largely indifferent to copyright’s protec-
tion, copyright law is not concerned with them. Other creation, including most 
commercial information goods—i.e., movies, television, music, and books—is 
incentivized by financial gain, both that of the author herself and that of the 
intermediary—i.e., book publisher, film studio, record label, etc. These goods— 
music in particular—are the subject of this Article and its recommendations. 
The centrality of term to copyright’s function (or malfunction, as the case 
may be) has long occupied scholars. The consensus among many intellectual 
property (IP) scholars is that the current copyright term is too long.10 Some 
 
8.  See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By establishing 
a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas.”). 
9.  See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW 
IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION 7 (2012) (considering creative industries such as fashion and food that 
enjoy little to no copyright protection and yet see plenty of innovation); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incen-
tives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1765–66 (2012) (discussing reasons authors might create in 
the absence of financial incentives). Some artists—such as tattoo artists, comedians, and graffiti artists—
perhaps would be motivated by financial incentives but, in their absence, have come to be motivated by 
cultural norms. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence 
of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2008) (showing 
that stand-up comedians create jokes independently of copyright’s incentives); Aaron Perzanowksi, Tattoos & 
IP Norms, 98 MINN. L. REV. 511, 513–14 (2013) (describing the tattoo industry’s market-driven alternative to 
IP). To be clear, the fact that some works are created without regard to financial gain does not diminish the 
fact that financial incentives are central to copyright. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (holding 
that the “economic philosophy” of copyright is to “advance public welfare” by “encourag[ing] . . . individual 
effort” through “personal gain”). 
10.  See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 2, at 350 (“The period of copyright protection is at present too long and 
should not be extended beyond fifty-six years.”); Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension 
Legislation, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 199, 251 (2002) (referring to the CTEA as “broad,” “indiscriminate,” and 
“unconstitutional”). A limited scholarly exception is Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner’s 
2003 proposal for an indefinitely renewable copyright. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely 
Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 473 (2003). The authors based their proposal on an analysis of 
copyright registration and renewal data held by the Copyright Office, a limited data set at best, since neither 
registration nor renewal is required by law. Id. at 496. See also discussion infra Part I.C.3 Of course, some 
commentators have argued in favor of the current term (and even in support of longer terms), citing “incen-
tivized creation” on intuitive grounds. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Intellectual Property Law 
Association in Support of Respondent at 16–17, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) 
(“[E]xtending the term of existing copyrights makes it easier for copyright holders, and other creators, to 
pursue opportunities to further develop, disseminate, and exploit existing works. . . . In this way, too, extend-
ing the term of existing copyrights promotes progress by ‘motivat[ing] the creative activity of authors and 
inventors . . . .’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984))). The authors are not aware of any empirical evidence that the Sonny Bono Act has 
resulted in greater creation or access thereto, for example. 
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have made economic arguments against a long copyright term, concluding that, 
over time, the cost of strong copyright protection outweighs the benefit.11 
Others have made thoughtful and interesting arguments focused on the 
inefficiency that an overly long copyright term can bring, including the encour-
agement of market entry that may be of questionable social value.12 Most of the 
arguments against a lengthy copyright term, however, are intuitive or instinc-
tual. Justice Breyer’s seminal conclusion that copyright’s term should not be 
extended (and is likely already too long) is, in his own words, “impressionistic 
and derived from conversation with publishers.”13 Nonetheless, term is widely 
considered key to harmonizing copyright’s dual goals of incentivizing creation 
of and promoting access to content. But how important is term really? This is 
the question we set out to answer in this Article. 
Utilizing music industry sales data that track unit sales, streaming, and other 
consumption of songs and albums by format (CD, digital download, stream) 
over time, this Article fills an important evidentiary gap in the literature. Using 
a representative sample of recorded music as a case study, we empirically model 
the extent of commercial viability over time. Our central finding is that for the 
average musical work, sales drop sharply soon after release. Importantly, our 
analysis herein focuses on the overall empirical patterns in a representative set 
of music, because copyright does not protect subgroups of music differently 
but instead treats all music in the same way. Consequently, while subgroup anal-
yses might be interesting from a social science perspective, they are less inter-
esting from a legal perspective. For this reason, we do not here address sub-
group analyses, and instead leave that question to future empirical research. 
Our analysis suggests two primary results of interest to legislators, lawyers, 
and scholars alike. First, we establish an important empirical baseline for future 
policy discussion: for the average work, the societal cost of strong copyright 
protection that goes beyond the point of commercial viability outweighs the 
benefit to both creators and consumers as the marginal return on this protec-
tion decreases sharply. A more efficient regime can support creators and inter-
mediaries by offering them the most protection very early in the term when 
they have the most to gain. After that point, consumers might be better served, 
and copyright owners scarcely affected, by a looser regime of protection that 
brings greater access, sooner. Our analysis therefore contributes to the norma-
tive debate around copyright’s incentive–access paradigm by proposing a more 
efficient conception of copyright law: one that replaces the conventional “life 
 
11.  See, e.g., Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, Eldred, 537 
U.S. 186 (No. 01-618) [hereinafter Akerlof] (“Taken as a whole, it is highly unlikely that the economic benefits 
from copyright [term] extension . . . outweigh the additional costs.”). 
12.  See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, A New Uneasy Case for Copyright, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1644, 1680 
(2011) (“Though [even stronger copyright protection] would maximize the production of works, rent dissi-
pation theory indicates that the marginal works produced might be of little or negative social value . . . .”). 
13.  Breyer, supra note 2, at 325 n.171. 
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plus” durational standard with one based on the commercial viability of the 
average work.14 
Second, and most importantly, our determination that the average infor-
mation good has an incredibly short commercial lifespan demonstrates that ad-
vocates’ and legislators’ tendencies to focus on atypical works—i.e., those that 
are exceptionally successful, or unusually delayed in their earnings—leads to 
overprotection of the average work, suggesting that copyright’s term is not 
nearly as significant to copyright owners15 as conventional wisdom submits and 
that reformation efforts might be better spent elsewhere. 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part I offers a positive description and 
brief history of the debate around the current copyright term; a review of some 
of the literature critiquing its propensity toward suboptimal incentivization, rent 
seeking, and social waste; and a summary of the case in favor. This Part is ex-
pected to be uncontroversial yet critical; it establishes term as a quintessential 
copyright problem to be solved. Part II picks up where Justice Breyer’s intuition 
left off to make the empirical case that the strongest protections are needed 
when an information good is at its most commercially viable. Strong copyright 
protection makes the most sense for the first five to ten years following their 
release, since most information goods earn the majority of the revenue that they 
are ever going to earn in that time.16 Part II goes on to explain how this con-
clusion is normatively consistent with phenomena commonly observed in the 
relevant industries and discusses the selection bias that leads to and perpetrates 
overprotection. Part III summarizes our empirical and normative findings and 
teases out some possible policy implications. The Article concludes with the 
determination that, notwithstanding a century of debate to the contrary, term 
is in fact not central to the optimization of copyright’s protection, such that 
advocates’ time and energy could be more productively spent elsewhere. In-
depth analysis of streaming’s impact, as well as a breakdown by status (block-
buster v. nonblockbuster), genre, age of release, and platform, are reserved for 
future work. 
 
14.  Both Professors Justin Hughes and Joseph Liu have made similarly time-based proposals in the 
fair use context. See Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 799 (2003) (“When a work is 
new, unauthorized uses are less likely to be fair uses; when a work approaches the end of its copyright term, 
unauthorized uses are increasingly likely to be fair uses. As more and more of a work’s term is in the past, 
unauthorized uses, particularly small ones, should be more likely to be fair uses.”); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright 
and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 410 (2002) (“[T]he older a copyrighted work is, the greater the 
scope of fair use should be—that is, the greater the ability of others to re-use, critique, transform, and adapt 
the copyrighted work without permission of the copyright owner. Conversely, the newer the work, the nar-
rower the scope of fair use.”).  
15.  Discussion herein will distinguish between private and social effects, the latter of which remain 
significant. 
16.  To be sure, the exact length of the strong protection period is debatable but need not be deter-
mined with precision here to make the point that it is a lot shorter than the current, uniform term. 
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I. COPYRIGHT’S TERM & ITS DISCONTENTS 
Lawmakers, lawyers, and scholars alike have long focused on copyright’s 
duration as key to optimizing the balance struck under the incentive–access 
paradigm. This Article suggests that this emphasis is misplaced and that copy-
right’s term is yet another example of the sneaky divergence between law in 
doctrine and law in practice. This Part begins with a brief history of the ongoing 
debate around copyright’s term in an effort to highlight the (misplaced) im-
portance placed upon it. Part I.B lays out a positive description of the current 
copyright term, and Part I.C offers a brief review of some of the representative 
literature. Finally, Part I.D summarizes, and responds to, arguments in support 
of a lengthy copyright term. 
A. A History of Obsession with Term 
Copyright, as we know it, began—under the Statute of Anne, passed in 
1710—with a term of fourteen years, renewable for one additional fourteen-
year period only if the author was still alive upon the original period’s expira-
tion.17 The Copyright Act of 1790 brought that renewable fourteen-year term 
to the colonies.18 Eventually, that fourteen-year term was extended to twenty-
eight years (with a one-time option to extend for an additional fourteen years) 
in 1831.19 The 1909 Copyright Act kept the original twenty-eight-year term but 
augmented the extension period to an additional twenty-eight years.20 The cur-
rent statute, the Copyright Act of 1976 (the Copyright Act), extended the term 
to life of the author plus fifty years (or seventy-five years in the case of works 
for hire).21 It was the Sonny Bono Act that got us where we are today by adding 
yet another twenty years to the term. 
The Sonny Bono Act was introduced in 1995.22 Backed by the entertain-
ment industries that were led by the Disney Corporation, the bill sought an 
extension that was both prospective and retrospective.23 Disney’s Mickey 
Mouse copyright—worth $8 billion in 199824—was set to expire in 2003,25 and 
 
17.  Copyright Act of 1710, 8 Ann. c. 21 (Eng.).  
18.  Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124. 
19.  Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439. 
20.  Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080. 
21.  Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572. 
22.  Daren Fonda, Copyright Crusader, BOS. GLOBE MAGAZINE, Aug. 29, 1999, at 12. 
23.  Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301–04). 
24.  Fonda, supra note 22, at 25. 
25.  Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1998, at 22. 
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the company had much to gain by extending this revenue stream (among oth-
ers).26 To that end, Disney’s then-CEO Michael Eisner met with then-Senate 
Majority Leader Trent Lott, who shortly thereafter signed on as cosponsor of 
the bill.27 Of the thirteen sponsors of the House bill, Disney financially contrib-
uted directly to ten of them.28 In the Senate, Disney financially contributed to 
eight of the twelve sponsors.29 Three years after its introduction, the Sonny 
Bono Act was signed into law by President Clinton on October 27, 1998.30 
Beaten but not defeated, the coalition of librarians, scholars, and others 
who opposed the CTEA focused their litigation efforts on the retrospective 
component of the extension. Led by Harvard law professor Larry Lessig, the 
lawsuit, originally titled Eldred v. Reno when filed at the District Court for the 
District of Columbia,31 made it to the Supreme Court as Eldred v. Ashcroft in 
2002.32 Two of the constitutional challenges raised by appellants focused on the 
Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution, which grants to Congress the 
authority to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”33 
Appellants argued that the retrospective portion of the CTEA violated 
both the “limited Times” language of the Intellectual Property Clause and the 
spirit of the mandate by failing to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”34 As to the former, appellants argued that repeated extensions of the 
Copyright Act effectively amount to protection of indefinite duration.35 As to 
the latter, they argued that one cannot promote the creation of extant works.36 
Thirty-five separate amicus briefs were filed on both sides of the case by authors 
ranging from economists and library associations to AOL Time Warner and the 
Directors Guild of America.37 
Citing, among other things, parity with patent law extensions, the Supreme 
Court ultimately determined that Congress acted within its authority under the 
Intellectual Property Clause’s “limited Times” requirement in passing the 
 
26.  For example, Winnie the Pooh was worth nearly as much as Mickey Mouse. See, e.g., Damian Reece, 
Disney Faces Loss of $6bn Pooh Revenues, TELEGRAPH (May 11, 2003, 12:01 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
finance/2851501/Disney-faces-loss-of-6bn-Pooh-revenues.html [https://perma.cc/3HSK-ZR29]. 
27.  Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort, supra note 25. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Id. 
30.  Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified 
as amended at 17. U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301–304). 
31.  74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). 
32.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002), amended by 534 U.S. 1160 (2002). 
33.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. There was also a First Amendment argument not relevant for the 
immediate purposes. 
34.  Id.; Brief for Petitioners at 18–22, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)(No. 01-618). 
35.  Id. at 18. 
36.  Id. at 22. 
37.  See OPENLAW: Eldred v. Ashcroft, supra note 6. 
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CTEA. In so determining, the Court looked to historical precedent for retroac-
tive copyright extension, which reasoned that an “author who had sold his 
[work] a week ago [should not] be placed in a worse situation than the author 
who should sell his work the day after the passing of [an extension].”38 
Despite the Supreme Court’s nod to previous patent extensions, the his-
torical tendency toward extension of the copyright term is a marked departure 
from the approach to duration taken elsewhere in IP. Compared to copyright’s 
seventy-plus-year term, patents currently enjoy a nonrenewable term of twenty 
years,39 while federally registered trademarks are granted an initial ten-year pe-
riod of protection, renewable in ten-year increments only when continuing use 
can be shown.40 The conventional explanation for the divergence between cop-
yright term and patent term is that patent protection is stronger than copyright 
protection, thereby justifying a shorter term.41 
The uniformity of terms across categories of copyrighted goods is also 
unique. In other areas of IP, it is common to differentiate between types of 
work when determining the duration of protection. For example, design patents 
enjoy a term of protection ranging from fourteen to fifteen years (depending 
on whether they were filed before or after May 13, 2015),42 as compared to the 
standard patent term of twenty years. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act 
of 1984 (SCPA) 43 establishes a ten-year term of protection for semiconductor 
chips.44 Likewise, the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act (VHDPA)45 grants a 
ten-year term of protection46 to “[t]he design of a vessel hull, deck, or combi-
nation of a hull and deck.”47 
 
38.  Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204 (first alteration in original) (quoting 7 REG. DEB. 424 (1831)). 
39.  The original 1790 Patent Act set the maximum term for a patent at fourteen years. Patent Act of 
1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109. An amendment in 1861 extended that term to seventeen years. Act of Mar. 2, 
1861, ch. 88, 12 Stat. 246, 249. Finally, the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act extended patent protection 
to its current term of twenty years. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 154(2), 108 Stat. 
4809, 4984 (1994). 
40.  Trademark’s protection is potentially infinite at this point. 
41.  In a working manuscript, Professor Peter Menell has warned against the making of false equiva-
lencies between the three branches of IP. Peter Menell (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
42.  See 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2012); 1505 Term of Design Patent [R-08.2017], USPTO.GOV, https://www.uspto. 
gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s1505.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). 
43.  Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335, 3347 (1984). 
44.  17 U.S.C. § 904(b) (2012). Although the SCPA is codified under Title 17, it is not a copyright but 
rather a sui generis form of IP. See Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F. 2d 1555, 1563 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). 
45.  Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2905 (1998). As with the 
SCPA, the VHDPA is codified in Title 17 (in this case, as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act) but 
is a sui generis form of IP. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., THE VESSEL 
HULL DESIGN PROTECTION ACT: OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 (2003), https://www.copyright.gov/reports 
/vhdpa-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZNQ7-8B26] (“The provisions [pertaining to vessel hull design] do 
not . . . provide copyright protection. Rather, they establish sui generis protection for original designs of vessel 
hulls.”). 
46.  17 U.S.C. § 1305(a). 
47.  Id. § 1301(a)(2). 
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Some jurisdictions likewise differentiate even between types of copyrighted 
works. For example, “[v]irtually all industrialized nations recognize a more ro-
bust sound recording performance right than the United States.”48 For its part, 
the United States did not extend copyright protection to sound recordings until 
the 1976 Act.49 Indeed, and as discussed further in Part III, the U.S. copyright 
regime prior to 1976 had significantly more term variation among different 
works than the current regime has. 
Given the existence of shorter grants of protection elsewhere in IP and the 
availability of different term lengths for different types of protected works, it is 
particularly surprising that little robust empirical analysis has been conducted 
to assess copyright’s effectiveness over time. There has certainly been no shortage 
of academic attention to the topic of copyright’s term: a Westlaw search of law 
journals and reviews for “(‘copyright term’ or ‘copyright duration’ or ‘copyright 
extension’) & (Eldred or CTEA or ‘Sonny Bono’)” turns up an astounding 
7,978 results.50 Some of this work is discussed further in Part I.C. 
B. A Single, Lengthy Term with Uniform Protection 
Copyright is unique among the branches of IP for its exceptional duration 
and undifferentiated level of protection. All copyrighted works, regardless of 
type, are entitled to the same term. 
1. Term 
The current copyright regime protects a copyrightable work51 for the life 
of the author plus 70 years, after which the work goes into the public domain 
where it may be used freely.52 In the case of a work for hire,53 the duration of 
 
48.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT OF THE 
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 89 (Feb. 2015), https://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-
and-the-music-marketplace.pdf. This distinction is because, at least in part, some other jurisdictions protect 
sound recordings under a noncopyright regime. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, Related Rights in United States Law 12–
22 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 18-59, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3267501 (discussing the differential treatment of sound recordings in, and outside of, the United 
States). 
49.  Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. 
50.  This search was conducted Sept. 20, 2018. 
51.  “Copyrightable work” is defined as an “original work[] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium 
of expression,” including literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, motion pic-
ture, sound recording, and architectural works. 17 U.S.C. § 102.(a). The definition explicitly excludes ideas. 
17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
52.  See id. § 302(a). Continuing trademark protection, the existence of copyrighted derivative works, 
or both may limit this use somewhat. 
53.  The Copyright Act defines a “work made for hire” as: 
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or 
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a 
part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as 
a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the 
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the copyright is 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation (which-
ever is shorter).54 In either case, the level of protection remains the same 
throughout the entire copyright period, with the copyright owner enjoying the 
same rights in year one as they do in year sixty-eight, for example.55 
2. Protection & Exceptions 
While a copyright remains in force, the copyright laws grant a rights holder 
the exclusive right to reproduce, to distribute, to prepare derivative works, and 
(for certain classes of works) to display and perform the work publicly.56 Absent 
a finding of fair use, violation of any of these exclusive rights constitutes copy-
right infringement.57 Remedies include monetary damages (actual or statutory) 
and equitable relief (such as injunction or seizure).58 The federal government 
can also bring criminal charges, although this remedy is rare.59 
Once a work reaches the end of its copyrighted life and enters the public 
domain, anyone may use it for any purpose. Until then, 17 U.S.C. § 106 makes 
clear that all derivative uses of a work must be authorized by the rights holder.60 
Assuming a derivative use is approved, § 103(b) assigns a copyright to the de-
rivative work itself, with protection limited to the derivative author’s incremen-
tal additions to the original work.61 
Some prospective users may be able to take advantage of one of the extant 
compulsory licenses, such as the § 115 license for cover songs.62 Otherwise, in 
order to avoid a claim of copyright infringement, one looking to create a work 
derivative of a copyrighted work can seek permission from, or negotiate a li-
cense with, the rights holder. An especially patient (and long-lived) prospective 
user might instead wait until the copyright term expires and the work enters the 
public domain, after which point it may be used freely. 
 
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered 
a work made for hire. 
Id. § 101. 
54.  Id. § 302(c). 
55.  This assumes no future retroactive term extensions. See H.R. 3301, 115th Cong. (2018). 
56.  17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)–(6). 
57.  Id. § 501. 
        58.  Id. §§ 501–03. 
59.  Id. § 506. 
60.  Id. § 106. 
61.  Section 103(b) reads, in relevant part: 
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the 
author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and 
does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is in-
dependent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, 
any copyright protection in the preexisting material. 
 Id. § 103(b). 
62.  See id. § 115. 
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Alternatively, a prospective user may qualify for an exception to infringe-
ment under § 107 of the Copyright Act, which allows for certain “fair uses” of 
copyrighted works upon consideration of several factors, including the purpose 
of the use (e.g., educational), the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount 
and substantiality of the material used, and the effect of a use on the market for 
the work.63 Some courts observe an unspoken fifth factor: good faith.64 By 
“good faith,” courts mean that a judge or jury will often consider whether the 
derivative artist sought out the original artist and whether the derivative artist 
attempted to attribute the borrowed work.65 While different courts have 
weighed these factors differently in different cases, it is commonly understood 
that the greater the effect the use of a derivative work has on the market, the 
less likely it is to pass fair-use scrutiny.66 Under this rationale, a parody of a film, 
for example, is more likely to be deemed fair use (owing to its nonsubstitutabil-
ity with the original film) than a remix of a song (which may obviate the need 
to purchase the original song altogether). 
C. Critique 
This Subpart summarizes some of the representative literature critiquing 
copyright’s long and uniform term. We wish to emphasize that the critique pre-
sented in this Subpart is not a critique of copyright protection generally. The 
authors, and the literature as a whole, recognize the value of copyright’s exist-
ence in incentivizing creation as a baseline matter. The critique, rather, focuses 
solely on copyright’s duration. A recent paper by economists Michela Giorcelli 
and Petra Moser is illustrative of this distinction. In one of the few natural ex-
periments afforded by copyright, Giorcelli and Moser analyze data on operas 
produced across eight Italian states from 1770 to 1900.67 In 1801, two Italian 
states—Lombardy and Venetia—fell under French rule and assumed French 
copyright laws that did not exist in the remaining Italian states.68 Giorcelli and 
Moser observed a statistically significant increase in new operas produced in 
Lombardy and Venetia following the adoption of copyright laws, perhaps 
providing evidence of copyright’s contribution to creative production.69 When 
Lombardy and Venetia later moved to extend their copyright terms, however, 
 
63.  While earlier jurisprudence viewed fair use as an affirmative defense, the recent Ninth Circuit 
decision in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. brought case law in line with the statutory language of § 107 by con-
firming fair use as an exception to copyright infringement. 815 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Given that 
17 U.S.C. § 107 expressly authorizes fair use, labeling it as an affirmative defense that excuses conduct is a 
misnomer . . . .”). 
64.  See, e.g., Núñez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000). 
65.  See id. 
66.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
67.  See Michela Giorcelli & Petra Moser, Copyrights and Creativity: Evidence from Italian Operas 2 
(May 16, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2505776. 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. at 2–3. We say “perhaps” in acknowledgement of the fact that there may have been other 
cultural influences at play. 
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“there was no clear increase in the level or the quality of output, even though 
both states had responded strongly to the adoption of basic copyright laws.”70 
In other words, the existence of copyright contributed to increased production 
of creative works, but an extension of copyright’s term did not have any incre-
mental effect. 
The scholarly critique of copyright’s term falls into two broad categories: 
economic and intuitive.71 We summarize these critiques in Parts I.C.1 and I.C.2. 
There have also been a few empirical analyses conducted using tangential data, 
such as inventory numbers and registration renewals; we highlight the key take-
aways from those projects in Part I.C.3. 
1. Economic 
The size of the economic incentive provided to creators by copyright is 
measured by the present value of the anticipated compensation. The longer the 
term, the smaller the marginal additional incentive is in present-value terms, and 
the greater the incremental burden on society (as the copyright monopoly per-
mits above-cost pricing).72 Writing in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court 
regarding Eldred, a group of prominent economists summarized it this way: 
“Term extension for new works induces new costs and benefits that are too 
small in present-value terms to have much economic effect.”73 
In their work on copyright and antitrust, Professors Linda Cohen and 
Roger Noll determined that “[n]o plausible incentive rationale exists for this 
incredibly long duration.”74 They explained: 
As a matter of practical economics, the current duration of copyright amounts 
to a perpetual right in terms of the potential for financial reward to the creator. 
If the typical work is produced 30 years before the author’s death, the dis-
counted present value of a dollar of royalty income in the 105th year of the 
right is about $.00003. Put another way, if a work could capture $1 million in 
royalties in its 105th year, the present value of that prospect in the year the 
copyright was granted is $30. If the work can earn $1 million forever, the pre-
sent value on the copyright date of the stream of revenues from year 106 to 
the end of time is $300. Thus, for this incredibly valuable asset, the difference 
between the current copyright law and a perpetual right is almost nothing. Of 
 
70.  Id. at 4. 
71.  We might also add constitutional, but since the Supreme Court settled the constitutional question in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, we will focus here on the economic and the intuitive. 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) (“In pre-
scribing [the term extension], we hold, Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitu-
tional limitations.”). 
72.  See Akerlof, supra note 11, at 11. 
73.  Id. at 15. 
74.  Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 453, 471 (2001). 
2019] A Reconsideration of Copyright’s Term 365 
course, virtually no copyrighted work has anything remotely resembling this 
durability.75  
In other words, 
the result of the blanket extension of the copyright term [referring to the 
CTEA] was that a huge amount of intellectual property having little or no 
commercial value, yet potential value as a public domain input into future in-
tellectual property, will be kept out of the public domain for another twenty 
years.76 
When it comes to IP, deadweight loss—a form of economic inefficiency—
is a real concern: “Strong intellectual property rights increase the deadweight 
loss on innovations that would be forthcoming . . . [and] can lead to an ineffi-
cient duplication of R&D costs . . . .”77 Due to its exceptionally long duration, 
copyright in particular may overprotect the average work over time. Our anal-
ysis in Part II supports the conventional wisdom that copyright’s protection 
should be limited where it merely works to raise the cost of competing expres-
sion. 
Some commentators have alternately suggested that overly strong copy-
right protection afforded at later points in a work’s term may lead to, at best, 
marginally valuable works and, at worst, rent seeking over-entry into the various 
content markets.78 Consequently, the stronger the copyright protection, the 
more entry is encouraged—even where that entry may be of questionable social 
value. 
In other words, incremental expansion of the number of works in a partic-
ular genre over time is unlikely to add much social value. For example, in his 
work on product differentiation in copyright, Professor Michael Abramowicz 
offers the following illustration of this intuition: 
By writing a vegetarian cookbook, I may be able to win many sales that oth-
erwise would have gone to the . . . vegetarian cookbooks that already exist. My 
entry into the cookbook market might thus be an example of rent dissipation, 
because my investment in the cookbook project is aimed . . . at taking away 
rents . . . that the authors of existing cookbooks otherwise would have en-
joyed. Of course, my cookbook may offer some new recipes . . . and other 
features that . . . might increase the total rents available. The more cookbooks 
 
75.  Id. Cohen and Noll use a discount rate of 10%. More recent research suggests a discount rate 
closer to 2.6%, which would yield, in their example, a present value of $71,762—not $1 million but also not 
$30. See Stefano Giglio, Matteo Maggiori & Johannes Stroebel, Very Long-Run Discount Rates, 130 Q.J. ECON. 
1, 2 (2015). 
76.  WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 221 (2003) (discussing the inefficiency of the CTEA). 
77.  SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 98 (2004). 
78.  See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. 
L. REV. 317, 322 (2005) (suggesting that the efforts invested in some copyrighted works are of questionable 
social value and might be better spent elsewhere); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 259 (2004). 
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of a particular type that already exist, however, the smaller this increase is likely 
to be.79 
In other words, the optimal level of copyright protection for an infor-
mation good like a cookbook maxes out where any further increase in protec-
tion will merely raise the cost of new expression. This is because as the number 
of works in the public domain decreases (a result of strong protections that last 
too long), the cost of creation increases—there is less “raw material” for follow-
up creators to work with.80 
The second and third vegetarian cookbooks ever published, for example, 
may be appreciated not only for their diversity of recipes and introduction of 
consumer choice but also for the price control that each may exert on the oth-
ers. Competition lowers prices but only to a point. In a free market (for these 
purposes, a world without copyright), new cookbooks will cease to be created 
once the cost of doing so exceeds the revenue that the cookbook can demand. 
Even with copyright protection, the 3,000th vegetarian cookbook arguably in-
troduces little to no social value at the margin. For this reason, some scholars 
have suggested that weaker copyright protection might avoid this kind of ques-
tionably, or at least ambiguously, beneficial creation—creation that may be en-
couraged at the expense of other endeavors deemed more socially beneficial, 
such as opening a vegetarian restaurant.81 
Finally, the current copyright regime, with its lengthy term and uniform 
level of protection throughout, can, and often does, lead to overreach or rights 
accretion. Rights accretion—or the accession of additional (nonstatutory) rights 
to a copyright owner—results from an abundance of caution on the part of 
prospective licensees. Fear of infringement claims can lead prospective users to 
request and pay for licenses when none are necessary.82 This phenomenon is a 
predictable, and undesirable, result of a copyright regime whose protections are 
so broad—and its punishments so severe83—for so long as to suggest to a pro-
spective user that it is better to be safe than sorry. 
 
79.  Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
33, 39 (2004). A cookbook is admittedly not the strongest example given the very thin protection afforded 
them by copyright, but the point is taken. 
80.  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 
325, 332 (1989) (“Creating a new work typically involves borrowing or building on material from a prior body 
of works . . . . The less extensive copyright protection is, the more an author, composer, or other creator can 
borrow from previous works without infringing copyright and the lower, therefore, the costs of creating a 
new work.”). 
81.  See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 79. 
82.  See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 
903 (2007) (describing a “doctrinal feedback” loop that leads risk averse licensors to over-license). 
83.  See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Age: When the Remedy is the Wrong, 66 
UCLA L. REV. 400, 404 (2019) (“There is a growing understanding that statutory damage awards, as written 
into the Copyright Act in 1976, are a poor fit for the digital age. Because a statutory damage award is set for 
each individual infringed work, the total damages can add up significantly for online infringements that in-
volve multiple works.” (footnotes omitted)); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Cop-
yright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009) (“Awards of statutory damages 
are frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes grossly excessive.”). 
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2. Intuitive 
Two of the most enduring arguments against a lengthy term of copyright 
are taken from the publishing industry. Specifically, they are based on conver-
sations with, and testimonials from, booksellers themselves. 
The intuition that the commercial lifespan of information goods is far 
shorter than copyright’s term is not new. Perhaps the earliest such account can 
be found in a speech against a proposal for the extension of copyright given by 
Thomas Macaulay in the House of Commons on February 5, 1841: 
[T]he evil effects of the monopoly are proportioned to the length of its dura-
tion. But the good effects for the sake of which we bear with the evil effects 
are by no means proportioned to the length of its duration. A monopoly of 
sixty years produces twice as much evil as a monopoly of thirty years, and 
thrice as much evil as a monopoly of twenty years. But it is by no means the 
fact that a posthumous monopoly of sixty years gives to an author thrice as 
much pleasure and thrice as strong a motive as a posthumous monopoly of 
twenty years. On the contrary, the difference is so small as to be hardly per-
ceptible. We all know how faintly we are affected by the prospect of very dis-
tant advantages, even when they are advantages which we may reasonably 
hope that we shall ourselves enjoy. But an advantage that is to be enjoyed 
more than half a century after we are dead, by somebody, we know not by 
whom, perhaps by somebody unborn, by somebody utterly unconnected with 
us, is really no motive at all to action.84 
Consider also Arnold Plant’s 1934 work on copyright in books: 
If the now existing compulsory license or royalty system . . . were made to 
operate a few years—say five years—after first publication, instead of being 
delayed as at present until twenty-five years after the death of the author, se-
curity for publishers against competition would be preserved until their first 
editions were either disposed of or ‘remaindered,’ remuneration for authors 
would continue on all sales throughout the full copyright period, and the pub-
lic would no longer have to wait more than five years for cheap copies of the 
books they wish to buy. The first edition might still be issued by the publisher 
at the price which best suited his pocket under conditions of monopoly, but 
if he wished to retain the whole of the business the compulsory license system 
would then compel him to follow the present practice of many publishers and 
reissue his successes before the end of the five-year period at a price low 
enough to deter competitors.85 
Plant bases this proposal for a significant shortening of copyright’s term on 
several historical observations. He frequently refers to the travails of Scottish 
author David Hume as he navigates the London booksellers’ market: “David 
Hume wrote to his publisher William Strahan: ‘I have heard you frequently say, 
 
84.  Macaulay, supra note 1, at 735–36. 
85.  Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167, 194–95 (1934). 
368 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2:351 
that no bookseller would find profit in making an edition which would take 
more than three years in selling.’”86 
In his seminal work considering the justifications for copyright, Justice 
Breyer reaches a similar conclusion: 
Nor would extension [of the copyright term] provide significant additional 
incentive for publishers, for [book publishers] now normally base their publi-
cation decision upon an expectation that a book will earn a return within two 
years (tradebooks), five years (some texts), or at most ten or twenty years (cer-
tain reference books).87 
By his own admission, Justice Breyer’s claim here was “impressionistic” and 
obtained through conversation with various publishers.88 
3. Empirical 
To date, empirical work around copyright’s term has had to make use of 
peripheral data, such as retail inventory and registration data made available by 
the U.S. Copyright Office. 
For example, using a random sample of books for sale on Amazon.com, 
Professor Paul Heald conducted an empirical analysis of the availability for sale 
of new versus public-domain books. He reached the surprising conclusion that, 
contrary to the “underexploitation hypothesis”—the idea that copyright’s term 
should be long to prevent works from falling into the public domain only to 
never be heard from again—“[s]hortly after works are created and propertized, 
they tend to disappear from public view only to reappear in significantly in-
creased numbers when they fall into the public domain.”89 As such, Heald con-
cludes that, to the extent that “availability matters, . . . further attempts to ex-
tend the copyright term should be resisted, not encouraged.”90 Part II will show 
that this analysis makes sense for most information goods, where a work’s com-
mercial success or failure is typically evident within a very short time after pub-
lication, at which point the copyright owner either collects her rents or licks her 
wounds and moves on to the next project. 
In addition to being excessively lengthy, a copyright regime whose duration 
is based on the life of the author is arguably arbitrary; it necessarily affords dif-
ferent lengths of protection to different works with no discernable policy ra-
tionale. Consider, for example, two people, both age thirty, write a novel this 
year. One dies in a horrible car crash next year; the other lives to be ninety. Are 
 
86.  Id. at 194. 
87.  Breyer, supra note 2, at 325. 
88.  Id. at 325 n.171. 
89.  Paul J. Heald, How Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 829, 830 
(2014). The dissemination of works that have entered the public domain may alternately reflect rent dissipa-
tion as producer surplus declines. The question then might be whether consumer surplus increases by enough 
to make society as a whole better off. 
90.  Id. at 861. 
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we to understand that the novel written by the accident victim is deserving of 
less protection by virtue of her unexpected death? In another example, two 
people compose a song this year—one age seventeen, the other age seventy. 
Are we to understand that the song written by the seventy-year-old is deserving 
of less protection due to the age of its composer? 
The historical explanation for a “life plus” term is that it was intended to 
cover two generations. Indeed, the move from “life . . . plus 50 years” to 
“life . . . plus 70 years” was meant to account for the increase in human longev-
ity.91 The so-called “two generation” standard comes from the Berne Conven-
tion,92 but its adoption in the United States is curiously incomplete. Section 203 
of the Copyright Act, for example, contemplates a termination right that vests 
in the author thirty-five years from the date that the copyright was originally 
granted to a third party, irrespective of the author’s age or lifespan.93 
In their quantitative work on copyright’s demographics, Professors Robert 
Brauneis and Dotan Oliar note, for example, that the average age of a creator 
registering a piece of music is 36.08, while the average age of a creator register-
ing a book is 46.25.94 They conclude: “This suggests that despite a facially uni-
form copyright term for individual authors, effectively music is protected for 
longer. Thus, society is holding out a greater carrot for those who create music. 
Society, at least at the margin, is signaling to authors that they should invest 
their efforts in some creative fields over others.”95 
In addition, they note that “female authors of music, in particular, are on 
average more than two years older than male authors of music.”96 Unless those 
women live at least two years longer than their male counterparts, this would 
seem to suggest that women are somehow entitled to less copyright protection 
than men. These and similarly nonsensical results are inherent in a “life plus” 
durational standard. 
In a new book looking at whether stronger copyright protections lead to 
more or less output, Professor Glynn Lunney engages four data sources—Niel-
sen SoundScan release data, Rolling Stone’s 500 Greatest Albums of All Time 
list, Billboard Hot 100 Chart, and Spotify’s list of the top 1,001 songs streamed 
in 2014 worldwide that had appeared on Billboard’s Hot 100 Chart before 
 
91.  See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 10 (1996). 
92.  See Berne Convention, supra note 4. 
93.  17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012). Cf. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42 (Can.) (describing Canadian copy-
right law’s reversionary right for authors, which terminates all grants twenty-five years after the author’s 
death). 
94.  Robert Brauneis & Dotan Oliar, An Empirical Study of the Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Age of Copyright 
Registrants, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 46, 80 (2018). 
95.  Robert Brauneis & Dotan Oliar, Copyright’s Race, Gender and Age: A First Quantitative Look at Regis-
trations 36 (Geo. Wash. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Paper No. 2016-48, 2016), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2831850. 
96.  Id. at 26. 
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2006—to conclude that stronger protections actually lead to lower productiv-
ity.97 While Lunney’s work focuses on the strength of protections rather than 
their duration, the two are inextricably linked: any inefficiencies caused by a 
miscalculation in the strength of protection are exacerbated by an overly long 
term. As such, his conclusion in favor of a shorter copyright term is also sup-
ported by our work herein. 
A 2003 project by Landes and Posner utilized data on copyright registra-
tions and renewals over a ninety-year period to consider whether a system of 
indefinite renewals for copyright might be more efficient than a “life plus” term. 
They found that “most copyrights depreciate rapidly and therefore few would 
be renewed if even a slight fee were required; the sheer bother of applying for 
renewal appears to be a significant deterrent.”98 This is consistent with the pat-
tern seen in patent law, where more than half of patents granted are never re-
newed.99 Ultimately, owing to the existence of both commercially viable and 
non-commercially viable works, they determine that a system of indefinite re-
newal might be a better deal for both types: owners of commercially viable 
works are more likely to be willing to incur the cost and hassle of registration 
and renewal than owners of non-commercially viable works, resulting in more 
of the latter works making it into the public domain quicker. In their analysis, 
Landes and Posner reasonably assumed that only owners of a copyright on a 
commercially viable work would bother with registration and renewal. Since 
neither registration nor renewal are required under copyright law, however, and 
because rights holders register (or fail to register) for a variety of reasons—
including cultural background, money (or the lack thereof), and know-how100—
our analysis here offers a more accurate and precise measure of commercial 
viability. 
In 2009, Professors Raymond Ku and Jiayang Sun, along with Ph.D. can-
didate Yiying Fan, also took a look at copyright registration patterns in an effort 
to test the incentive theory of copyright.101 Utilizing U.S. copyright registrations 
filed from 1870 through 2006 as a proxy for the number of works created—
again, a rough proxy, as registration has not been required since March 1, 
 
97.  GLYNN LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS: MONEY AND MUSIC IN THE US RECORDING INDUSTRY 
86–116 (2018). 
98.  Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 474. 
99.  See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Marketplace for Ideas?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 395, 424 
(2005) (“[M]ore than half of patents awarded are deemed unworthy of renewal and are abandoned by their 
conceivers ten years after the application date.”). 
100.  See, e.g., Justin Hughes & Robert P. Merges, Copyright and Distributive Justice, 92 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 513, 551 (2016) (observing a disadvantage posed by former registration requirements that “handicapped 
protection of original expression of authors who lacked sophisticated knowledge of the law or access to legal 
representation”). 
101.  Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Jiayang Sun & Yiying Fan, Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Em-
pirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1667, 1671–72 (2009). 
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1989102—the authors considered whether changes in copyright protections 
move consistently with registrations. They found that they do not.103 
In what is probably the most relevant empirical work for our purposes, 
economist Rufus Pollock, in a pair of papers considering copyright over time, 
used available data to establish an optimal copyright term for recordings and 
books of fifteen years and to predict that this optimal term is likely to fall as 
production costs decline.104 The author’s primary source of data for this work 
is a Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law (CIPIL) report based 
on self-reported industry data, allowing only for empirics that are, in the au-
thor’s words, “somewhat crude.”105 Our work in the next Part utilizes a data set 
that is considerably more robust. 
D. Support 
Despite the prevalence of anti-term extension sentiment that permeates the 
literature, there are also plentiful arguments in favor of a lengthy copyright term. 
1. Economic 
Some of these arguments are based in policy, economics, or both. Some 
argue, for example, that a longer copyright term better allows a creator to take 
advantage of future technological developments that may extend his or her 
work’s commercial value, potentially leading to broader distribution: “Because 
term extension gives copyright owners the incentive to exploit these opportu-
nities [presented by technological development], existing works have been pub-
lished in new, more usable and versatile formats, and disseminated widely.”106 
Another popular argument in favor of a longer copyright term is cross-
subsidization, or the business model under which intermediaries attempt to di-
versify their risk portfolios by taking a chance on a variety of projects with the 
expectation that the hits will subsidize the flops. Because the content industries 
tend to operate as winner-takes-all markets,107 for every hit, there are many, 
 
102.  See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT NOTICE 1 (2017), https://www.copyright.gov/ 
circs/circ03.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XAR-3P8Z]. 
103.  Ku, Sun & Fan, supra note 101, at 1672 (“Despite the logic of the theory that increasing copyright 
protection will increase the number of copyrighted works, the data do not support it. Instead, our findings 
demonstrate that the historic long-run growth in new copyrighted works is largely a function of population. 
Sharp changes are mostly due to procedural shifts . . . .”). 
104.  Rufus Pollock, Forever Minus a Day? Calculating Optimal Copyright Term, 6 REV. ECON. RES. ON 
COPYRIGHT ISSUES 35, 52 (2009); Rufus Pollock, Optimal Copyright Over Time: Technological Change and the Stock 
of Works, 4 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 51, 51 (2007). 
105.  Pollock, Forever Minus a Day? Calculating Optimal Copyright Term, supra note 104, at 56. 
106.  Brief of Amici Curiae American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers, et al. in Support 
of Respondent at 18, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) (referencing the 1995 Senate 
Hearing 34 statement of Bruce Lehman, assistant secretary of commerce and commissioner of patents and 
trademarks). 
107.  See discussion infra Part II.C.1.c. 
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many flops. For this reason, “any extension of copyright protection inherently 
reduces intermediaries’ cost of capital, thereby improving intermediaries’ capac-
ity to fund, distribute and market new creative projects.”108 This may be true of 
extant copyright intermediaries, but it is inarguably outside the scope of copy-
right’s mandate to favor one particular model of intermediation over another. 
On the international stage, a lengthy copyright term mirrors the policy 
adopted in other high-profile jurisdictions, such as the European Union.109 
Without this harmonization, U.S. artists may lose out on income from abroad. 
In a House hearing leading up to adoption of the CTEA, Hoagy Bix Carmi-
chael, then-president of AmSong, cautioned that: 
due to the shorter term of copyright in the U.S. our authors are not guaranteed 
equivalent protection in foreign countries. As a result, some of our greatest 
cultural treasures are falling into the public domain while they are still com-
mercially viable and would continue to generate significant revenues for the 
U.S. from abroad.110 
2. Moral 
Other arguments in favor of a lengthy copyright term are moral in nature, 
which is to say that they focus on the need for lengthy protection in order to 
demonstrate respect for the artists and art that enrich our lives, communities, 
and culture. In an article exploring the intersection of copyright and creation, 
Matthew Barblan writes that artists “need to put their kids through college, pay 
the mortgage, save for retirement, and pay for healthcare expenses” just like 
everyone else.111 He goes on to note that: 
While it’s fashionable to point out that technology has lowered the costs of 
artistic production, creating art can nonetheless require significant investment 
of time and money. . . . For a high-quality, professional album, costs for the 
studio, recording engineer, producer, studio musicians, back-up singers, mix-
ing, and mastering can push the price tag into the hundreds of thousands of 
dollars. In film, independent film budgets can run into the millions of dollars, 
and the biggest blockbusters can reach into the hundreds of millions of dol-
lars. Without copyright to secure creators’ property interests in their work, it 
is hard to fathom how artists would be empowered to undertake [such] pro-
jects. . . .112 
 
108.  Jonathan M. Barnett, Copyright Without Creators, 9 REV. L & ECON. 389, 408–09 (2013). 
109.  Norma Dawson, Copyright in the European Union—Plundering the Public Domain, 45 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 
193, 193 (1994). 
110.  Pre-1978 Distribution of Recordings Containing Musical Compositions; Copyright Term Extension; and Copy-
right Per Program Licenses Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
105th Cong. 218 (1997) (statement of Hoagy Bix Carmichael). 
111.  Matthew Barblan, Copyright as a Platform for Artistic and Creative Freedom, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
793, 794 (2016). 
112.  Id. at 795 (footnotes omitted). 
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As the next Part will show, there is really no need to choose a side in this 
debate. Even assuming that creators are financially incentivized and that copy-
right is the optimum means of doing so, the term over which that financial 
incentive is earned is significantly shorter than the current one. 
II. MUSIC: A CASE STUDY 
“Somebody said to me, ‘But the Beatles were anti-materialistic.’ That’s a huge myth. John and 
I literally used to sit down and say, ‘Now let’s write a swimming pool.’”  
– Paul McCartney113 
The incentive theory of copyright says that copyright can encourage the 
production of creative works by offering protections designed to financially re-
ward creators.114 As the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein explained: “The eco-
nomic philosophy behind the [Intellectual Property C]lause . . . is the convic-
tion that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors.”115 To that 
end, our analysis in this Part looks at the commercial half-life of songs and 
albums. 
According to a 2013 analysis conducted by the Bureau of Economic Anal-
ysis (BEA), most songs depreciate 65% in their first year of life116 and earn 
almost all of the revenue that they are going to make in the first five years from 
the date of release.117 A decade from its initial release, the average album retains 
a mere 19% of its initial value, reflecting a depreciation rate of 26.7% per year.118 
To compare, the BEA sets the depreciation rate for movies on premium 
cable at 10% per year and on regular cable at 5% per year.119 Sequel rights are 
estimated to constitute 5% of a movie’s total value.120 Sequels, where they will 
 
113. David Fricke, Paul McCartney: One for the Road, ROLLING STONE (Feb. 8, 1990), https://www. 
rollingstone.com/music/features/one-for-the-road-19900208 [https://perma.cc/TBE6-AMXT]. 
114.  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By establishing a 
marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and dis-
seminate ideas.”). 
115.  347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
116.  Rachel Soloveichik, Music Originals as Capital Assets 27 (Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Working Paper 
No. WP2013-8, 2013), https://www.bea.gov/system/files/papers/WP2013-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
23WG-PZ49]. 
117.  RACHEL H. SOLOVEICHIK, RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT: ARTISTIC ORIGINALS AS CAPITAL ASSETS 50 
(2011), https://estadisticas.pr/files/BibliotecaVirtual/estadisticas/biblioteca/BEA_2011_ArtasCapital 
Assets.pdf. 
118.  Soloveichik, supra note 116, at 27. To be clear, this sharply declining revenue stream is typically 
enjoyed by an intermediary record label, not directly by the artist. Instead, musicians are generally motivated 
by the prospect of future fortune and fame under the winner-takes-all model, irrespective of copyright pro-
tections. For a detailed look at musician revenue streams, see generally Peter DiCola, Money From Music: Survey 
Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 301 (2013). 
119.  Rachel Soloveichik, Theatrical Movies as Capital Assets 20 (Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Working Paper 
No. WP2013-7, 2013), https://www.bea.gov/system/files/papers/WP2013-7.pdf. 
120.  Id. at 21. 
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exist, are most commonly produced within five years of the release of the orig-
inal movie.121 
Episodes of long-lived television programs lose approximately one-third of 
their value in the first year following their release.122 For about a decade follow-
ing that, television episodes depreciate at a rate of roughly 11.4% per year (or 
4.16% per quarter).123 Again, the current copyright regime affords television 
programs the same level of protection during their commercially productive 
lifespan as in the decades following, to no apparent advantage. 
In publishing, there are a very small number of commercially successful 
books. The handful of commercially successful books released each year earn 
most of their revenues in the first few years and have an annual depreciation 
rate of 12% per year.124 In other words, publishing sees revenues approaching 
zero three years after initial publication. 
While there are some differences in the way that each of the commercial 
information goods categories behave, the overarching pattern of depreciation 
is the same.125 Since music is widely considered the category to first feel the 
impact of technological developments and changes in consumer behavior,126 it 
serves as a good proxy for commercial information goods as a whole.127 
A. Data 
In the following pages, we analyze a random sample of 1,200 albums re-
leased between January 1, 2008, and December 31, 2017.128 For each album, 
our data include the number of physical and digital units sold, as well as the 
total number of individual sales and streams of its constituent songs. These 
sales figures are reported weekly for the entire study period. The data set pro-
vides highly granular commercial information for up to ten years per album (the 
actual length of each window depends on when the album was released).129 
 
121.  Id. 
122.  Rachel Soloveichik, Long-Lived Television Programs as Capital Assets 28 (Bureau of Econ. Analysis, 
Working Paper No. WP2013-9, 2013), https://www.bea.gov/system/files/papers/WP2013-9.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AFN6-6AFZ]. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Rachel Soloveichik, Books as Capital Assets 3 (Bureau of Econ. Analysis, Working Paper No. 
WP2013-11, 2013), https://www.bea.gov/system/files/papers/WP2013-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH96-
KG7S]. 
125.  See generally Soloveichik, supra note 124, at 14–19 (depreciation of books); Soloveichik, supra note 
122, at 22–29 (depreciation of television); Soloveichik, supra note 116, at 21–29 (depreciation of music); 
Soloveichik, supra note 119, at 16–28 (depreciation of movies). 
126.  See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 48, at 12 (noting that technological development has 
put music copyright “under significant stress”). 
127.  The authors look forward to running similar analyses on other categories of information goods 
when, or if, the data become available. 
128.  This date range is a function of data limitations. Nielsen did not begin tracking all sales types—
i.e., albums, tracks, and streams—until 2008, thereby limiting the universe of releases within which we can 
compare apples to apples. 
129.  Both of these data sets are © The Nielsen Company, used herein under license. 
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Our data are stratified by year, with each stratum containing a random sam-
ple of 120 albums released in each year between 2008 and 2017. The albums 
represent a broad range of genres, as shown in Table 1. This genre distribution 
is reflective of that seen in the population of total albums released, with most 
releases coming from the Rock, Pop, Hip-Hop, R&B, Country, Latin, and Chris-
tian/Gospel genres. 
One aspect of our sample requires extra care: because it is drawn randomly 
from the entire population of releases in Nielsen’s database, not all albums are 
equivalent. Most are typical “new releases,” with the full range of sales and 
streams across all media. Some of these releases, however, were not sold as 
digital albums. Still others are “compilation” albums, for which the individual 
songs were not sold separately. To avoid artificially inflating the number of zero 
counts, we construct different subsets for song, physical album, and digital al-
bum sales, respectively. In each case, we include only units with at least one sale 
of that medium in the entire period. 
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B. Methodology and Empirical Analyses 
To estimate the average commercial viability of music, we use Poisson re-
gression, which is a standard econometric tool for the analysis of count data.130 
Poisson regression is part of a family of extensions of linear regression known 
as generalized linear models.131 The model assumes (a) that the dependent var-
iable (in our case, a count of music sales or streams) takes a Poisson distribution 
with mean 𝜆 and (b) a log-linear relationship between the dependent variable 
and the covariates that we model (that is, the dependent variable is the log of a 
linear combination of the covariates). As emphasized by several authors, the 
Poisson model can also be seen as having a quasi-maximum likelihood justifi-
cation, which means that the second of the above two assumptions is the critical 
one for point identification.132 
For our primary results, we investigate the univariate relationship between 
commercial viability and time, using four different dependent variables: physical 
album sales, digital album sales, song streams (aggregated by album), and song 
sales (again, aggregated by album). Our chief interest is investigating this rela-
tionship across all genres, mirroring the uniform nature of copyright law. 
Since the release dates of albums are spread throughout our study window, 
we first generate a new variable—Weeks Since Album Release (t)—to standardize 
our measure of sales over time across albums. Then we regress sales (or 
streams) on flexible functions of t. Given that we expect to see a nonlinear 
relationship between sales and time, our specific implementation includes, in 
addition to time itself, a covariate for the square root of time.133 Our sample 
includes a wide range of music, including both blockbuster hits and obscure 
artists. Because of this, there is significant heterogeneity in overall sales volume 
between albums, leading us to try a fixed-effects specification for our regres-
sions.134 However, our results are not sensitive to model choice, and we present 
the “pooled” results (i.e., without the individual effect) in the text below. In 
short, we use the parametric approximation 
λit=exp(β1xit+β2 xit), 
 
130.  JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 
645–46 (1st ed. 2002). 
131.  Logistic regression, commonly used in empirical legal studies, is another family member. 
132.  Specifically, the estimator has a robustness to violations of the information matrix equality. See 
A. COLIN CAMERON & PRAVIN K. TRIVEDI, REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF COUNT DATA 63 (Econometric 
Soc’y Monographs No. 30, 1st ed. 1998); WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 130, at 646–56. 
133.  To account for both within-album correlation over time and over-dispersion of the dependent 
variables, we use robust standard errors clustered at the album level. See CAMERON & TRIVEDI, supra note 
132. 
134.  Formally, the fixed-effect Poisson estimator (FEP) for our model has the form 
λit=ai exp(β1xit+β2 xit), where ai is the album-specific effect. See Jerry Hausman, Bronwyn H. Hall & Zvi 
Griliches, Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R & D Relationship, 52 
ECONOMETRICA 909 (1984). 
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where λit is the number of sales (or streams) of album i at week t and x simply 
equals t. 135 
1. Sales 
Table 2 shows estimates of the pooled regression results across the full 
sample for each of the three “sales” outcome variables. Poisson coefficients are 
somewhat more complex to interpret than those of traditional ordinary least 
square regression because they do not characterize a simple linear relationship. 
Instead, the coefficients represent semi-elasticities: a one-point change in t is 
associated with a percentage change in the outcome variable (in our case, aver-
age sales volume). For a concrete way to interpret the results, consider song 
sales. A move from time period t = 0 (first week of release) to t = 1 (second 
week of release) is associated with a 0.76 change in predicted sales; in other 
words, a 22% decrease in the number of songs sold for each album.136 Note 
that the rate changes with increases in t: a move from t = 2 to t = 3 reduces the 
average sales count by only 7%. This mild complexity is an unavoidable aspect 
of dealing with nonlinear models and somewhat increases the task of interpret-
ing results. 
 
Table 2. Pooled Poisson Estimates, Full Sample137 
 Song Sales,  













Cons. 9.29 8.05 8.62 





135.  The specification can be stated equivalently as log λit =xit' β. 
136.  To see why, note that Y(t=1)=exp(9.29+ 0.004*1-0.252*√1) and Y(t=0)=exp(9.29). Then, 
Y 1 /Y 0 =.78, and 1-0.78 =0.22 or 22%. Of course, this rate decreases as t increases (as the figures below 
demonstrate visually). 
137.  Z-statistics are in parentheses. 
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A more intuitive way to interpret results from a Poisson model is to look 
at the predicted (fitted) values plotted in Figures 1 through 4. In each case, the 
black line shows the model prediction. To demonstrate the close fit of the 
model to the underlying data, we underlay the actual average sales values as 
points. As the graphs suggest, the model is a close fit to the data for each of our 
dependent variables. 
The results show a striking drop in the average number of sales of new 
music early in the release window. The average album loses approximately one-
third of its initial song sales volume within the first two months of release and 
falls to half of its initial peak after only four months. By the end of the first year, 
average sales are only around 20% of the initial volume. There is also a marked 
difference between the shelf lives of whole albums and their songs. Average 
physical and digital album sales drop to almost zero after only a year. Clearly, at 
least some of the albums’ constituent songs have a longer commercial life than 
the entire album. 
 
Figures 1–4. Pooled Poisson Regressions, Full Sample 
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Streaming is an increasingly important platform for music distribution but 
requires careful handling in our analysis. The major streaming services did not 
come online until much later in our study window—Apple Music and Google 
Play in 2015 and Amazon in 2016. Our analysis of song streaming patterns must 
therefore use a subset of the main data, and so we restrict our analysis in this 
Subpart to the final two years of our data: 2016 to 2017. 
Table 3 and Figure 5 show the main results for streaming volumes. Due to 
the small sample size, our estimates are only marginally significant (our uncer-
tainty is reflected in the much wider confidence intervals). Nevertheless, we can 
draw several tentative conclusions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, streaming availabil-
ity results in far higher overall volume; our underlying data show that songs are 
streamed many more times than they are purchased. Average streaming vol-
umes also appear to drop less rapidly than sales, suggesting that streaming may 
prolong the commercial viability of the average record. However, streaming re-
imbursement rates are so low that the economic benefit of this additional vol-
ume is unclear. Of course, these results are only suggestive; the short window 
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Table 3. Pooled Poisson Estimates, Restricted Sample 
 Song Streams,  
Aggregated by Album 







Figure 5. Song Streams (Aggregated by Album), Restricted Sample (2016–2017) 
 
 
Although the model predictions are broadly similar to those in Figures 1 
through 4, the raw data in Figure 5 exhibits an unusual upward tick toward the 
end. Further exploration shows that this is driven by two albums: Rihanna’s 
ANTI and Pink Floyd’s Greatest Hits album. These albums were released early 
in the study window (2016–2017) and happen to have atypically high volume 
of streams.138 
 
138.  To be clear, both albums have a high number of streams, but their trajectories differ. Rhianna’s 
ANTI has a higher-than-normal stream volume but essentially follows the same curve as the average album. 
Streams of the Pink Floyd album actually grow over the study window. While interesting, the full implications 
of this type of atypical growth exceed the scope of this Article and are reserved for future work. 
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In Figure 6, we show the average streaming volumes for the entire sample 
(“All,” as shown in Figure 5 above) and for a restricted sample, which excludes 
these two albums (“Restricted”). Because we observe only a handful of albums 
for the full two-year period (that is, albums which were released in early January 
2016), these two albums have an outsize effect on the average at t = 98, 99, and 
so on. With those albums excluded, the shape of the curve conforms to our 
expectations, in line with the earlier results. Unfortunately, this is simply an ar-
tifact of our data—in particular, the small sample size created by the short win-
dow of observation for streaming. 
 
 




Taken together, our results show that most commercial sound recordings 
earn the majority of their lifetime revenues in the months—not years—follow-
ing their initial release. This suggests that the current term of copyright protec-
tion is excessive by a wide margin. Not only does copyright protection exceed-
ing the period of commercial viability fail to further incentivize creation (which 
can be fully incentivized, and rewarded, in a much shorter period of time), it 
also leads to deadweight loss by denying the public use of the work for a term 
that far exceeds any benefit incurred. 
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C. Normative Analyses 
We start from a normative assumption that the strongest copyright protec-
tions are needed when an information good is at its highest commercial viabil-
ity. The empirical analysis in Part II.B shows that since most information goods 
earn the majority of all of the revenue that they are ever going to make in the 
first five to ten years following their release, this is where strong copyright pro-
tection makes the most sense.139 This Subpart explains how this conclusion is 
normatively consistent with phenomena commonly observed in the relevant 
industries and discusses the selection bias that leads to, and perpetrates, over-
protection in the space. 
1. Commercial Viability 
Having empirically demonstrated the excesses of a “life plus” durational 
standard when viewed through the lens of revenues, this Subpart introduces a 
new measure—commercial viability—and describes its advantages over the sta-
tus quo. The period of “commercial viability,” as that term is used herein, refers 
to the period of time during which the average information good earns the sub-
stantial majority of its total revenues. 
It is important to note that the vast majority of copyrightable information 
goods never reach the point of commercial viability at all; in some cases, these 
works are motivated by something other than financial gain. Copyright is not 
concerned with the latter. It should also be noted that the commercial viability 
standard proposed herein is intended for application to commercial infor-
mation goods only. Some other copyrighted works—such as fine art pieces—
have a different earnings trajectory, so this theory is not applicable to those 
works. 
Why the emphasis on commercial viability? We suggest that revenue is the 
driver behind the decision to produce commercial information goods in the 
first place and thus lies at the very heart of the incentive theory.140 Indeed, “cop-
yright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit 
from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by result-
ing in the proliferation of knowledge. . . . The profit motive is the engine that 
 
139.  To be sure, the exact length of the strong-protection period is debatable but need not be deter-
mined with precision here to make the point that it is much shorter than the current uniform term. 
140.  Cf. Stan J. Liebowitz & Alejandro Zentner, The Motivations to Create 21 (Sept. 24, 2018) (un-
published manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3195384 [https://perma.cc/ 
3M87-VGLT] (showing that up to 80% of book authors are not primarily motivated by financial gain). Be-
cause these authors are likewise not aided by copyright protection, our proposals do not apply to their work 
product. 
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ensures the progress of science.”141 In reference to IP protection, James Madi-
son likewise observed that “[t]he public good fully coincides . . . with the claims 
of individuals.”142 
While the concept of commercial viability is novel in the context of copy-
right term, it is well established in the broader context of how the copyright 
industries work. In support of commercial viability’s suitability for this purpose, 
the next three Subparts describe real-world applications of the commercial via-
bility principle as recognized and employed by the industries that produce and 
distribute copyrightable information goods. 
a. Versioning 
Time-based “versioning,”143 as the term is used herein, is a differential pric-
ing strategy that offers different consumers different versions (or qualities, or 
formats) of an information good at different prices and at different times.144 
For example, most commercial movies are released first in theaters (i.e., “the-
atrical release,” sometimes simultaneously with an “in theaters now” pay-per-
view version); then via regular pay-per-view, other on-demand services, or both; 
then on home-video formats (DVD/Blu-ray); and finally, they may be licensed 
for television.145 These versioning decisions directly reflect commercial viability 
assessments on the part of copyright owners. 
For example, the average movie has a theatrical life span of ten weeks,146 
and that figure itself is decreasing.147 Within six months following its theatrical 
release, a typical movie has earned pretty much all of the box-office money that 
it is ever going to earn over its commercial lifetime.148 Home-video release typ-
ically follows some four to six months after theatrical release. Most revenues 
from home-video formats are earned in the first year following release, after 
 
141.  Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 60 F.3d 913 
(2d Cir. 1994). 
142.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 288 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). The veracity of 
this claim is debatable; regardless, the sentiment expressed supports a financial motivation behind copyright 
protection. 
143.  “Versioning” is the economic term of art; the same concept is often called “windowing” in in-
dustry speak. 
144.  Paul Belleflamme, Versioning in the Information Economy: Theory and Applications, 51 CESIFO ECON. 
STUD. 329, 333 n.7 (2005) (“Time-based versioning [is defined as] follow[ing] the tactic of delay. For example, 
new books often appear first in hardcover and later as less expensive paperbacks. . . . The price of these 
choices usually declines with the viewing date.” (emphasis omitted)). 
145.  The versioning schedule for most commercial films also includes foreign theatrical, international 
on-demand, and multiple foreign-language home-video releases; however, as those formats are not affected 
by U.S. copyright law, they are excluded from the analysis. 
146.  Kamel Jedidi et al., Clustering at the Movies, 9 MARKETING LETTERS 393, 393 (1998). 
147.  See Mark Lorenzen, Creativity in Context: Content, Cost, Chance, and Collection in the Organization of the 
Film Industry, in CREATIVITY, INNOVATION AND THE CULTURAL ECONOMY 93, 107 (Andy C. Pratt & Paul 
Jeffcutt eds., 2009). 
148.  Soloveichik, supra note 119, at 17. 
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which revenues from DVD and Blu-ray sales drop sharply and continue declin-
ing year after year, albeit at a slowing rate of decline.149 Next, most movies are 
shown on premium cable channels, typically some nine months or so following 
their theatrical release.150 These movies then move to regular cable networks 
around twenty-four months following initial release.151 
In the music industry, technology has shaken up the traditional versioning 
strategy, namely: hit-single release (radio only), physical-album release, second-
single release (radio and physical), deluxe physical-album release, and catalog-
compilation release (e.g., The Best of Salt-n-Pepa). In contrast, the modern, digital 
versioning strategy for music typically looks more like this: 
 
Table 4. 




Simultaneous radio and digital download of hit single; re-
lease to streaming services (sometimes exclusive to one 
streaming platform) 
.5 Simultaneous physical album release and digital album and tracks available for download 
6 Streaming exclusives end; album and all tracks go to all streaming services (if formerly withheld) 
18 Active marketing ceases; album moves to catalog152 
 
 
Conversations with music industry sales executives have revealed a couple 
of additional interesting recent developments. First, streaming services have be-
gun to offer windowing within their platforms. Specifically, premium-tier us-
ers—i.e., those who pay—get access to albums sooner than users on the free-
mium (or ad-sponsored) tier.153 Second, the nature of ongoing discovery via 
 
149.  Id. at 17–18 (showing a depreciation rate of 14% per year for four to nine years after the date of 
home-video release and a 5% depreciation rate between years ten and fourteen). 
150.  HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONOMICS: A GUIDE FOR FINANCIAL 
ANALYSIS 138–40 (9th ed. 2015). 
151.  Id. 
152.  Indeed, the industry defines catalog product as works eighteen or more months from the date of 
release. See, e.g., Does the Music Industry’s Definition of ‘Catalogue’ Need an Upgrade?, MUSIC BUS. WORLDWIDE 
(Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/music-industrys-definition-catalogue-need-up-
grade/ [https://perma.cc/VVR2-H5DG]. 
153.  See Press Release, Universal Music Grp., Spotify and Universal Music Group Announce Global, 
Multi-Year License Agreement (April 4, 2017), https://www.universalmusic.com/spotify-and-universal- 
music-group-announce-global-multi-year-license-agreement/ (“Starting today, Universal artists can choose 
to release new albums on premium only for two weeks, offering subscribers an earlier chance to explore the 
complete creative work, while the singles are available across Spotify for all our listeners to enjoy.”). 
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playlists on music-streaming services like Spotify appears to extend some al-
bums’ commercial runs from the traditional eighteen months to—on the long 
end—something approaching thirty-six months.154 
Similarly, particularly successful television programs (i.e., those that make 
it past a pilot and first season and, ideally, continue on to syndication)—called 
“long-lived television programs” in industry-speak—begin their lives on either 
a cable network or on broadcast television and then move to syndication (only 
when they are no longer producing new episodes), usually on local broadcast or 
specialty cable channels.155 
b. Winner-Takes-All 
For better or worse, the winner-takes-all phenomenon described herein 
pervades the entertainment industries and serves as another example of com-
mercial viability driving decisions about which content to produce. The cost of 
a movie ticket or the price of a CD, for example, remains constant to the con-
sumer regardless of how much money its production cost the studio or label to 
produce. For this reason, one could be forgiven for thinking that those in the 
business of producing information goods would aim to keep costs as low as 
possible, thereby maximizing their revenue potential for the work. In fact, the 
opposite is often the case in the entertainment industries, where movie studios, 
music labels, and book publishers universally engage in a business strategy that 
invests huge sums of money into a handful of individual productions—films, 
albums, books—in hopes of striking it big.156 Only a few of these works suc-
ceed; most incur losses, sometimes very large ones. Books are particularly sus-
ceptible to the winner-takes-all phenomenon; a typical book sells only a few 
copies immediately after publication and then disappears forever.157 
The idea of a world in which superstars rise to fame and fortune while other 
artists toil in obscurity is as old as the idea of microeconomics itself. Ironically, 
in his seminal work, economist Alfred Marshall actually used a musician as his 
example of a professional not prone to the curses of superstardom: 
[S]o long as the number of persons who can be reached by a human voice is 
strictly limited, it is not very likely that any singer will make an advance on the 
 
154.  This anecdotal evidence about a delayed catalog period is supported by a recent case study con-
ducted by Spotify. In it, the company analyzed all tracks released during April 2015 and found that 40% of 
those tracks actually streamed more in year two than in year one. See Does the Music Industry’s Definition of ‘Cata-
logue’ Need an Upgrade?, supra note 152. This and related streaming-specific phenomenon are reserved for future 
work. 
155.  As with some movies, some television programs have a foreign-market strategy, as well, but that 
versioning aspect is excluded from this analysis as irrelevant to the U.S. copyright question. 
156.  See, e.g., ANITA ELBERSE, BLOCKBUSTERS: HIT-MAKING, RISK-TAKING, AND THE BIG BUSINESS 
OF ENTERTAINMENT (2013). 
157.  See generally ALBERT N. GRECO, THE BOOK PUBLISHING INDUSTRY (2d ed. 2005). 
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£10,000 said to have been earned in a season by Mrs. Billington at the begin-
ning of the last century, nearly as great as that which the business leaders of 
the present generation have made on those of the last.158  
Obviously, advances in recording and distribution have proven Marshall wrong. 
Economist Sherwin Rosen has put a finer point on these advances; his the-
oretical model finds superstar effects to be driven by imperfect substitution and 
scale.159 “Scale,” in this context, means that an artist (or band, film, or book) 
can use ever-evolving technology to reach a bigger and bigger audience.160 “Im-
perfect substitution” here basically means that people prefer to listen to a single 
song that they like rather than listen to two dozen songs that they don’t. 
The challenge with the blockbuster strategy embraced by big entertainment 
is that success breeds success; directors of box-office hits are hired to direct 
other films destined to be box-office hits, resulting in a “positive feedback ef-
fect[]” that yields a handful of fortunate creators and a relative dearth of oppor-
tunity for everyone else.161 In addition to being inefficient, winner-takes-all mar-
kets contribute to income and wealth inequality and raise concerns about 
distributional justice.162 
Importantly for our purposes, the winner-takes-all model serves as an ex-
emplar of the commercial-viability assessment. A film studio knows by opening 
weekend whether it has a hit on its hands—and therefore a product worth in-
vesting additional marketing dollars in—or a flop—in which case it can scratch 
plans for additional marketing and cut its losses. 
c. Consumer Behavior 
The way in which consumers engage with and consume information goods 
dictates how, when, and for how much those works are made available and sold. 
In other words, consumer behavior is a primary factor in determining commer-
cial viability. 
When it comes to consumption, there are several constraints that impact 
which works a consumer will spend money on. First, there are simple time (and 
attention) constraints and competition for that time and attention. For example, 
the average consumer sees no more than three to four films in the theater per 
 
158.  ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 728 (MacMillan 1890). 
159.  Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845, 845–46 (1981). 
160.  Ironically, at the same time as technology has greatly expanded the audience for information 
goods, it has also severely limited revenue given the cheap and easy replication options. 
161.  See ELBERSE, supra note 156, at 130 (describing a “lucrative career for the lucky winner and a 
dearth of opportunities for the hundreds of other hopefuls”). 
162.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 212–17 (1995) 
(suggesting, among other things, a greater tax burden on society’s biggest “winners” to even the playing field). 
Some European countries, like France and Spain, compensate for this phenomenon by offering state subsi-
dies to developing artists. Such a subsidy program has never caught on in the United States. For a list of 
European state-sponsored art grants, see, e.g., Funding in Europe, DUTCHCULTURE TRANSARTISTS, 
https://www.transartists.org/article/funding-europe [https://perma.cc/AB9M-87WW] (last updated July 
2016). 
388 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2:351 
year.163 (And then, most of those moviegoers see the same handful of films as 
their moviegoer friends.) With hundreds of movies made every year,164 that is a 
considerably outsized supply (and one arguably supported by an overly protec-
tive copyright regime). 
Indeed, today’s consumer suffers from an embarrassment of content. In 
2016, for example, the film industry released 718 movies.165 According to Bill-
board, the number of albums released by the record industry in 2010 went down 
22% from the year before to a “mere” 75,000 titles (of which, to the winner-
takes-all point above, 60,000 sold fewer than 100 units total).166 The advent of 
self-publishing—especially on user-friendly platforms like Amazon—has added 
an additional 700,000 self-published titles to the 300,000 books traditionally 
published each year.167 That’s one million books per year. All of this means that 
the average consumer has less time to spend revisiting a favorite film, exploring 
the catalog of a newly discovered musician, or getting even remotely close to 
reading this year’s hottest young-adult fiction, thereby shrinking still further the 
potential for revenues too far beyond a work’s release date.168 
Consumption patterns, which vary from good to good, also impact com-
mercial viability. For example, under current copyright law, a consumer who 
purchases a hard-copy book can reread it or pass it on to a friend without having 
to pay additional monies to the publisher.169 This process allows the book’s 
publisher only one bite at the apple per consumer, with format and pricing de-
cisions made accordingly. A consumer who pays to download a single song 
might subsequently download a compilation containing that same track and 
then might also subscribe to a service like Spotify that allows her to stream the 
same song from her desktop at work. This phenomenon represents multiple 
bites at the same apple for the music publisher, record label, songwriter, and 
recording artist, with differential impact on versioning decisions. 
In addition, the inherent social utility of consuming the same content as 
one’s peers leads social media to play an increasingly important role in dictating 
 
163.  See, e.g., MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AM., THEATRICAL MARKET STATISTICS 16 (2016), 
https://www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/MPAA-Theatrical-Market-Statistics-2016_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4H94-M2GW]; id. at 3 (“Audiences between the ages of 18 and 24 attended an average of 
6.5 movies over the course of the year—more than any other age group.”). 
164.  Id. at 4, 21 (noting 718 total films released in 2016, up 1% from the total released in 2015). 
165.  Id. 
166.  Glenn Peoples, Business Matters: 75,000 Albums Released in U.S. in 2010 – Down 22% from 2009, 
BILLBOARD (Feb. 18, 2011), https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/1179201/business-matters-
75000-albums-released-in-us-in-2010-down-22-from-2009 [https://perma.cc/56TE-QRE2]. 
167.  BOWKER, SELF-PUBLISHING IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010-2015, at 3 (Sept. 7, 2016), 
http://media.bowker.com/documents/bowker-selfpublishing-report2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/U73X-
JYT7]; Steven Piersanti, The 10 Awful Truths About Book Publishing, BERRETT-KOEHLER PUBLISHERS, 
https://www.bkconnection.com/the-10-awful-truths-about-book-publishing (last updated Sept. 26, 2016). 
168.  For a thoughtful and poignant perspective on how today’s consumer cannot hope to make a dent 
in the annual cultural offerings, see Linda Holmes, The Sad, Beautiful Fact That We’re All Going to Miss Almost 
Everything, NPR (Apr. 18, 2011, 9:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/monkeysee/2011/04/21/135508305/ 
the-sad-beautiful-fact-that-were-all-going-to-miss-almost-everything [https://perma.cc/L4ZR-YJBK]. 
169.  See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). 
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consumption. A consumer often derives greater utility from watching the same 
television show as her coworkers because that viewing decision gives her some-
thing to chat about around the watercooler. Book clubs depend upon this same 
premise, as does the exchange of playlists on services like Spotify (which may 
also announce to your Facebook “friends” or Twitter “followers” which songs 
you have listened to so that they can listen to the same songs, further narrowing 
the field of songs in play commercially). 
This social influence is compounded on platforms like Facebook that allow 
you to “share” something with your network that someone else has shared with 
you: “To make popular content, it’s not enough to know your friends or your 
followers . . . . It’s about knowing the friends of your friends and the followers 
of your followers. For something to go big, it has to be interesting . . . beyond 
your immediate audience—the audience of your audience.”170 It might also be 
noted that the sheer volume of content available today may reduce the benefits 
of network effects for consumers: if two friends each randomly choose one of 
the 700 original television shows currently available on Netflix,171 they are likely 
to choose different shows. Fewer options might increase the odds that they 
would both choose the same show, thereby giving them something to bond 
over. 
Network effects have also been shown to have significant influence on con-
sumer preferences. In a series of experiments, sociologists Matt Salganik and 
Duncan Watts invited participants to log in to a site offering samples of songs 
with the opportunity to download some of the songs for free.172 When logged 
in and prior to making their download selections, the participants could see how 
each song ranked in terms of how many times it had been downloaded by prior 
participants. The first 750 participants saw the actual download tallies. The sub-
sequent 6,000 subjects saw an inverted tally of download rankings (i.e., rankings 
that put the least popular song at the top and the most popular song at the 
bottom). In the second group, the least popular song (which they thought was 
the most popular) did surprisingly well in terms of download counts, and the 
most popular song (which they thought was least popular) performed dismally, 
thus demonstrating that the perception that a song is popular has a profound 
effect on its popularity.173 
Technological development and concomitant changes in consumer behav-
ior continue to impact versioning decisions, of course, but they do so by shifting 
revenue streams—not by extending them. For example, the advent of e-books 
 
170.  DEREK THOMPSON, HIT MAKERS: THE SCIENCE OF POPULARITY IN AN AGE OF DISTRACTION 
215 (2017). 
171.  Todd Spangler, Netflix Eyeing Total of About 700 Original Series in 2018, VARIETY (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/netflix-700-original-series-2018-1202711940/ [https://perma.cc/ 
FR24-GK7L]. 
172.  Matthew Salganik & Duncan Watts, Leading the Herd Astray: An Experimental Study of Self-Fulfilling 
Prophecies in an Artificial Cultural Market, 71 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 338, 340–44 (2008). 
173.  Id. 
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(which are not so readily shareable as physical volumes) has added a third for-
mat choice, and price point, to the binary “hardcover or paperback” decision 
when it comes to books: a consumer who might have otherwise purchased one 
of the traditional versions may instead opt to purchase an e-book. This is not a 
second bite, as that consumer is less likely to also purchase a hardback or paper-
back version (since she can read and reread the e-book without paying addi-
tional royalties). That consumer may not be able to pass their e-book version 
on to a coworker, however, potentially leading to one more additional sale for 
the publisher than it might have gotten had the consumer initially purchased 
the book in physical (i.e., readily shareable) format. 
In film, pay-per-view movies that run simultaneously with a film’s theatrical 
run—so-called “in theaters now” movies—may expand a film’s overall viewer-
ship, while reducing its box-office take (or even its box-office cut, as some the-
aters will accordingly pay less for a nonexclusive product). The effect on reve-
nue, then, varies. It does not, however, expand the duration over which the film 
earns revenue. 
2. Selection Bias 
The current copyright laws cover a broad range of subject matter—from 
registration eligibility to fair-use exceptions for infringement—and many dif-
ferent types of content—from photographs to choreography to cheerleader 
uniforms. As such, there is a tendency to overprotect large swaths of copyright-
able work in an effort to address niche situations that may merit some greater 
level of protection. In particular, lobbying drives a disproportionate amount of 
attention toward especially successful content, resulting in selection bias that 
perpetrates overprotection in the space. 
A recent example of this selection bias in favor of atypically successful 
works is the CPA Act,174 signed into law in late 2018 as part of the Music Mod-
ernization Act of 2018 (MMA).175 The name of the Act itself is suggestive of its 
bias: CPA stands for Classics Protection and Access. Which songs qualify as 
“classics”? And why is it copyright’s role to compensate those songs uniquely 
from other, nonlegacy artists’ (presumably less important) works? 
So what does the CPA Act do? In a nutshell, pre-1972 sound recordings 
do not enjoy federal copyright protection.176 Instead, to the extent they are pro-
tected at all, it is by a hodgepodge of state and common law.177 This has always 
 
174.  Classics Protection and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132 Stat. 3676, 3728–37 (2018). Title 
II of the MMA was formerly known as the Compensating Legacy Artists for their Songs, Service, and Im-
portant Contributions to Society, or CLASSICS Act. 
175.  Orrin G. Hatch–Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 
(2018). 
176. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 SOUND 
RECORDINGS, at vii (2011), https://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf. 
177.  Id. 
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resulted in differential treatment of these works, and the advent of digital 
streaming has only served to further exacerbate the issue. The CPA Act aims to 
bring pre-1972 sound recordings under federal-copyright protection. 
Specifically, the CPA Act adds a new chapter—Chapter 14—to Title 17 of 
the U.S. Code in which it establishes that unauthorized use of a sound recording 
fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to the same remedies as any 
other form of copyright infringement.178 
While this law sounds like a step in the right direction, in practice, the CPA 
Act only benefits sound recordings that are being actively exploited. In other 
words, the rights holder for a hit oldie recording stands to benefit, while an ob-
scure (i.e., average) jazz artist is unlikely to receive any benefit. The latter’s record 
label, if she has one, is not likely to revive the (commercially valueless) recording 
or otherwise make it available anew on streaming services. At the same time, oth-
ers are prevented from doing so. Despite this arguable conflict with both of cop-
yright’s policy goals—incentivizing creation (because you can’t incentivize works 
already created or creators already deceased) and ensuring consumer access (since 
the Act keeps works out of the public domain for longer than they otherwise 
would have been)—the CPA Act, as part of the MMA, passed unanimously in 
the House and the Senate. This demonstrates a high level of selection bias in favor 
of overprotection. 
III. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The impetus behind our analysis herein was a desire to ground the conver-
sation about copyright’s term in industry-certified data and robust empirical 
analysis. We hope that the data set we have developed here will inform not only 
other academics working in the space but also industry players on both sides of 
the debate as they work to influence and shape copyright legislation going for-
ward. Part III.A summarizes our empirical findings; Part III.B teases out some 
possible policy implications of those findings. 
A. Summary 
Specifically, our analysis shows that for the average musical work, the drop-
off in sales of albums and songs is extraordinarily rapid, falling to one-tenth of 
initial levels well within a year. Notably, our analysis focuses on the overall em-
pirical patterns in a representative sample of music albums and songs. It inten-
tionally does not tease out higher performing genres, blockbuster artists, or 
“greatest hits” compilations. This is because copyright treats all music, regard-
less of commercial success, in the same way. Consequently, while we 
acknowledge a temptation toward subgroup analysis, we resist doing so here 
 
178.  17 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (2012). 
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due to lack of import from a statutory perspective. Instead, we leave the ques-
tion of subgroup analysis to future empirical research. 
B. Implications 
The empirical analysis in Part II suggests that a better approach to balanc-
ing copyright’s benefits is to (i) afford the creator (or copyright owner) the most 
protection when it will provide the most benefit for the creator, and then (ii) 
lessen that protection (thereby expanding access for users) when such a shift 
results in the least burden to the creator. We propose that a duration of some-
where between five to ten years would serve the overwhelming majority of in-
formation goods, during which time all uses by a party other than the rights 
holder (excepting fair uses) would require advance negotiation with, and per-
mission from, the copyright owner.179 Thereafter, the regime could open up to 
various compulsory uses. 
The estimated duration of five to ten years for the strongest protection is 
consistent with similar analyses on patents conducted by economist William 
Nordhaus in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In his work on how much protec-
tion patent law should afford inventors and innovators, Nordhaus determined 
that “once a life of six or ten years has been reached, the level of welfare gen-
erated by the patent system is very insensitive to the life of the patent.”180 Our 
analysis reaches the same general conclusion in the copyright context. 
Our analysis offers a few interesting policy insights: Part III.B.1 explores 
several possible changes to copyright’s duration and/or strength that work to 
reconcile the term and level of protection with the period of time in which the 
creators and intermediaries have the most to gain. Part III.B.2 considers the 
potential impact of such changes for both orphan and traditionally marginalized 
works. Finally, Part III.B.3 considers ways in which the insights presented 




179.  To be clear, the precise duration does not need to be determined definitively here in order for 
the hybrid regime to improve upon the status quo; the legislature could hear various perspectives and reach 
a reasoned time period. It suffices for these purposes to simply note that it should be significantly shorter 
than the current copyright term. 
180.  William D. Nordhaus, The Optimum Life of a Patent: Reply, 62 AM. ECON. REV., 428, 428 (1972). 
For more background on the work from which Nordhaus’s Optimum Life of a Patent article stems, see generally 
WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE (1969). 
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1. For Copyright Owners 
a. Dynamic Copyright Protection 
First, our analysis suggests that perhaps the strength of copyright protec-
tion should change over time. In their work on externalities in IP, Professors 
Brett Frischmann and Mark Lemley warn that “at some point, there are de-
creasing returns (in terms of improved incentives) to allowing property owners 
to capture more of the value from their inventions.”181 Our analysis suggests 
that an optimal copyright regime might flip to a looser period of protection at 
precisely this point of decreasing returns. 
In other words, we could implement a regime with the strongest protec-
tions in period one, lasting five to ten years. A second period could be set to 
last somewhere from twenty to twenty-five years, a somewhat arbitrary time 
period intended to bring copyright in line with the protections afforded most 
patented works. The important thing in this secondary phase is that the owner 
of the average work has, by this time, reaped a substantial portion of the work’s 
lifetime commercial value. As such, copyright protection beyond the first phase 
simply affords the rights holder additional time to realize residual income, if 
any, from ongoing or delayed interest in the work. 
Delayed earnings are an undeniable source of income for some works and 
some artists in some situations. For example, an artist’s death, especially if sud-
den and unexpected, may spark renewed interest in her body of work, both 
frontline and catalog.182 As mentioned in Part II.C.1.a, some commentators 
have observed that the advent of streaming has afforded older artists a chance 
to be rediscovered by a new generation of fans.183 Of course, these effects, when 
felt, are experienced by a handful of superstar artists only, and so they may not 
justify the institution of what amounts to a blanket term of overprotection for 
the average work. 
A prescription for differential treatment of copyrighted works at different 
points in the copyright term finds precedent, ironically, in the CTEA itself. The 
CTEA amended § 108 of the Copyright Act to provide: 
 
181.  Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258 (2007). 
182.  See, e.g., Andrew Gilden, IP, R.I.P., 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 639, 694 (2017) (“[I]t is important not 
to overlook that mourning can be an incredibly lucrative business opportunity . . . . For example, following 
their deaths, Michael Jackson captured the top ten spots on the Billboard albums chart, Whitney Houston 
held seven of the top ten spots on Amazon’s best seller list, and Prince’s sales surged 16,000 percent. Celeb-
rities can sometimes earn substantially more in death than in life, fueled by lucrative, nostalgia-rich ventures 
like Cirque du Soleil and Graceland, on top of diverse merchandising and advertising opportunities.” (foot-
notes omitted)). 
183.  See, e.g., Chris Parker, Old Vs. Older Catalog: Does Being a Legacy Artist Mean There’s More to Love? 
(Analysis), HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/earshot/old-older- 
catalog-does-being-599680 [https://perma.cc/N3B9-K6KK ] (“[T]hanks to digital availability and streaming 
sites, enduring artists with broad back catalogs have seen resurgent interest in older albums that in the past 
might have languished out-of-print or without retail distribution.”). 
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(h) (1) For purposes of this section, during the last 20 years of any term of copyright 
of a published work, a library or archives, including a nonprofit educational in-
stitution that functions as such, may reproduce, distribute, display, or perform 
in facsimile or digital form a copy or phonorecord of such work, or portions 
thereof, for purposes of preservation, scholarship, or research . . . .184 
Here, the legislature acknowledges the call for, and prescribes, differential 
treatment for late-term copyrighted works. In its own words, the House Judici-
ary Committee explained that “[t]his exemption would allow library users the 
benefit of access to published works that are not commercially exploited or otherwise 
reasonably available during the extended term.”185 In other words, the exemption 
allows greater access to works that have exhausted their commercial viability 
and to orphan works. 
Termination rights, embodied at § 203 of the Copyright Act, also serve as 
precedent for differential treatment based on duration of copyright protection: 
[(a)](3) Termination of the grant may be effected at any time during a period of 
five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the grant; or, 
if the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the period begins at the 
end of thirty-five years from the date of publication of the work under the grant or at 
the end of forty years from the date of execution of the grant, whichever term 
ends earlier.186 
Both of these limitations on copyright’s protection suggest support for a dy-
namic copyright system. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge for a proposal for dynamic copyright protec-
tion comes from the Berne Convention, which requires signatories to adhere to 
a term of “life of the author and fifty years after his death.”187 Citing a desire 
for uniformity and harmonization with EU-member countries that, in 1993, 
adopted a life-plus-seventy standard,188 the Committee on the Judiciary noted 
that: 
copyrighted works from nonmember countries will enjoy only the protection 
granted under the domestic laws of those countries if their respective terms 
of protection are less than the life-plus-70 standard adopted by the EU. In 
other words, works copyrighted in the United States would remain protected 
only for the lifetime of the author plus 50 years.189 
 
184.  Copyright Term Extension Act, S. 505, 105th Cong. (1998) (emphasis added). 
185.  H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 8 (1998) (emphasis added). 
186.  17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012) (emphasis added). The CTEA amended § 203 by deleting “by his 
widow or her widower and his or her children or grandchildren” from the first sentence in subsection (2) of 
subsection (a) and by adding subsection (D) to subsection (2). Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 
105-298, § 103, 112 Stat. 2827, 2829 (1998). 
187.  Berne Convention, supra note 4, at art. 7(1). 
188.  Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 10 (EC). 
189.  S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 4–5 (1996). 
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Thus, “[i]n order to safeguard the Nation’s economic interests and those of 
America’s creators in the protection of copyrighted works abroad,” the Sonny 
Bono Act was introduced and eventually passed.190 
Our proposal for dynamic copyright protection arguably contravenes this 
requirement by adjusting downward the level of protection afforded over time, 
thereby ending “full strength” copyright protection well before Berne’s life-plus 
period has lapsed. To this, we offer a few possible responses. First, this reaction 
may be overly determinative. The Convention doesn’t specify that the same 
level of protection must hold throughout the prescribed term. To the contrary, 
several articles in the Convention contain language suggesting that the drafters 
recognized a call for some level of flexibility within and between individual re-
gimes. With regard to fair uses, for example, Article 10(2) says: 
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union, and for special 
agreements existing or to be concluded between them, to permit the utiliza-
tion, to the extent justified by the purpose, of literary or artistic works by way 
of illustration in publications, broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for 
teaching, provided such utilization is compatible with fair practice.191 
Similarly, Article 10bis(1) begins: 
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the 
reproduction by the press, the broadcasting or the communication to the pub-
lic by wire of articles published in newspapers or periodicals on current eco-
nomic, political or religious topics, and of broadcast works of the same char-
acter, in cases in which the reproduction, broadcasting or such 
communication thereof is not expressly reserved.192 
In adopting a commercial viability standard vis-à-vis commercial information 
goods, the United States might well be acting consistently with Berne’s recog-
nition of each country’s sovereign legislative authority. 
Second, the United States has arguably only partially complied with at least 
a few other Berne requirements—moral rights and the prohibition on formali-
ties, for example. Article 5(2) of the Convention prohibits formalities, such as 
formal copyright registration, in order to enjoy copyright protections.193 The 
United States has skirted the edges of this requirement since first signing on in 
1989194: under the Copyright Act, an author doesn’t have to formally register to 
earn a copyright, but registration is required in order to sue for infringement in 
hopes of recovering statutory damages or attorneys’ fees.195 In a recent decision, 
 
190.  Id. at 5. 
191.  Berne Convention, supra note 4, at art. 10(2). For the avoidance of doubt, the term “fair use” as 
it is understood in the United States does not exist in Berne; rather, paragraph two of article ten refers to a 
comparable concept. 
192.  Id. at art. 10bis(1). 
193.  Id. at art. 5(2). 
194.  See generally Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853. 
195.  17 U.S.C. §§ 408(a), 411(a) (2018). 
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the Supreme Court clarified that such registration occurs “only when the Cop-
yright Office grants registration” and not upon the filing of the application.196 
Regardless, the United States requires registration for infringement recovery but 
only for United States authors,197 thereby arguably complying with its obliga-
tions under Article 5(2). Our dynamic protection proposal could likewise be 
limited to U.S. authors. 
Alternatively, our proposal for dynamic copyright protection might be sim-
ilarly implemented via remedies. For example, we might limit copyright owners 
to actual damages, a standard that would likely deter litigation around all but 
the smallest percentage of (very successful) works. In his work on copyright 
formalities, Christopher Sprigman proposes viewing formalities such as regis-
tration as a liability rule for unregistered works: 
[L]imiting remedies for unauthorized use to actual damages, and eliminating 
the prospect both of injunctive relief and the award of the defendant’s prof-
its . . . effectively permit[ting] use of a work without authorization, in return 
for a payment that would be measured by the value of a license had one been 
negotiated ex ante the use.198 
The 1971 Appendix to Berne is another example of the Convention’s flexibility 
toward remedies. In establishing compulsory licenses for translation and repro-
duction, for example, the Appendix sets specific time limits after which the 
licenses may be utilized.199 
In another example of the United States’ partial compliance with Berne, 
Article 6bis of the Convention describes the moral rights of authors that signa-
tory countries must recognize: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of 
the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work 
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other 
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to 
his honor or reputation.200 
In the United States, only some of these rights have been formally acknowl-
edged and, then, only with regard to visual arts under the Visual Artists Rights 
Act of 1990 (VARA).201 This arguably runs counter to a literal reading of 
 
196.  Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 888 (2019). 
197.  17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (stating “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States 
work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made” (emphasis 
added)). But see Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. YouTube, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 159, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (holding that 17 U.S.C. § 412, which prohibits recovery of statutory damages and attorneys’ fees for 
infringement of unregistered works, does not include an exemption for unregistered foreign works). 
198.  Christopher Jon Sprigman, Berne’s Vanishing Ban on Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565, 
1567 (2013). 
199.  Berne Convention, supra note 4, at art. II, III. For a robust summary of the Appendix’s terms and 
time limits, see DANIEL J. GERVAIS, (RE)STRUCTURING COPYRIGHT 341–44 (2017). 
200.  Berne Convention, supra note 4, at art. 6bis(1). 
201.  17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
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Berne’s requirement. Notwithstanding these potential breaches, the United 
States continues operating under the Convention, such that the same might be 
expected with the introduction of a commercial-viability standard for dynamic 
copyright protection. 
The idea of dynamic copyright protection is not entirely without precedent. 
In addition to the work by Hughes and Liu on fair use over time, discussed in 
the Introduction, William Patry and Judge Posner have proposed an expansive 
reading of fair use that might allow it to alleviate concerns stemming from the 
CTEA’s retroactive copyright extension. Referring to works retroactively 
brought back under copyright by the CTEA, Patry and Posner note that be-
cause “the works in question are very old and of very limited commercial value, 
the cost in time and expense of obtaining a license may exceed the private value 
of the license even though the social value of publication might be substan-
tial.”202 As such, they determine that the doctrine of fair use is “flexible enough 
to allow the copying of such works without having to obtain a copyright li-
cense.”203 
Even if it were determined that any form of dynamism in copyright pro-
tection violates Berne, our findings are still useful with regard to the broader 
questions about whether copyright’s term should be expanded still further and 
about whether countries that have not yet adopted a life-plus standard should 
do so. 
b. Differential Copyright Terms 
While our analysis focuses on music as a case study, Part II demonstrates 
that the overarching pattern of commercial depreciation can be extrapolated to 
other categories of information goods. This suggests that all forms of commer-
cial information goods might benefit from a shorter term than the status quo 
provides. It does not follow, however, that the shorter term should necessarily 
be the same across all works. For example, some countries recognize sound 
recordings as derivative works and so extend to them a shorter term of protec-
tion than they do the compositions that those sound recordings embody.204 
Recognition of this concept—i.e., differing terms of copyright protection for 
different types of copyrighted works—was seen in the United States as early as 
the 1950s, when the Copyright Office offered this guidance on the question of 
copyright duration: 
 
202. William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake of Eldred, 92 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1639, 1650 (2004). 
203.  Id. at 1660. 
204.  Compare Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations 1995, SI 1995/3297, art. 
5 (U.K.) (providing that “copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work . . . expires at the end of 
the period of 70 years from the end of the calendar year in which the author dies”), with id. at art. 6 (providing 
that “copyright in a sound recording . . . expires [either] at the end of the period of 50 years from the end of 
the calendar year in which it is made, or . . . if during that period it is released, 50 years from the end of the 
calendar year in which it is released”). 
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In some countries the nature of the work has been used to justify, for some 
kinds of works, a shorter term than that generally granted in the country in 
question. . . . 
 An argument is also made for varying the term according to the nature of 
the work on the basis of the commercial life of some types of works. . . . It 
has been introduced in discussions of possible short-term protection in the 
United States for designs, and for performances as distinguished from the 
work performed. 
 . . . . 
 It can be argued that if commercial value is significant in regard to the 
length of term, it leads to a conclusion against rather than for, a longer term. 
 . . . . 
 . . . If no work in a particular class would have commercial value after ten 
years, for example, it would certainly not increase the author’s incentive to 
protect the work beyond a ten-year period, and so, perhaps, a shorter term 
would be justified.205 
Unfortunately, these concerns were not well received by industry interests 
at the time, and a life-plus standard was eventually adopted to replace the pre-
vious system of renewals and notice.206 
c. Rights Reversion 
Our finding of a relatively short term of commercial viability for infor-
mation goods further suggests that intermediaries—i.e., record labels, film stu-
dios, book publishers, etc.—are compensated for their risk rather early on in 
the term, such that they are unlikely to be negatively impacted by a policy of 
rights reversion. Like termination rights,207 rights reversion gives the creator a 
second bite of the apple by reversing an artist’s original transfer of copyright 
ownership, thereby transferring ownership over a work’s copyright back from 
an intermediary to the original artist. In an effort to avoid authorial compla-
cency and to encourage donation to the public domain for works that have 
passed their commercial prime, legislators might even consider requiring the 
author to pay a fee—for example, $100—upon reversion; otherwise, the work 
could be set to automatically revert to the public domain.208 
 
205.  JAMES J. GUINAN, JR., STUDY NO. 30: DURATION OF COPYRIGHT, in S. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON 
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS STUDIES 53, 79–80 (Comm. Print 1961).  
206.  See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22–32 (2001) (discussing the evolution of copy-
right duration in the United States); Pamela Samuelson, Notice Failures Arising from Copyright Duration Rules, 96 
B.U. L. REV. 667, 673–77 (2016) (discussing Guinan’s Duration of Copyright study and its impact). 
207.  Title 17, Chapter 2, Section 203(a)(3) of the U.S. Code allows an artist who has previously granted 
her work’s copyright to an intermediary (other than via work-made-for-hire) to terminate that grant “at any 
time during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of execution of the 
grant.” 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (2012). 
208.  The proposed $100 reversion fee is intended purely as a placeholder. Should Congress wish to 
implement such a fee, the authors would strongly encourage a comprehensive study to determine an appro-
priate amount; a sliding scale may even be appropriate. 
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Notably, the Berne Convention has no prohibition against rights reversion. 
A final suggestion for avoiding conflict with Berne is to shift ownership from a 
publisher or record label back to the creator at the point when commercial vi-
ability is exhausted. This would allow the intermediary to reap its financial re-
ward, while also affording the artist a second chance to work or rework the 
material, to offer it up under a Creative Commons-type license, or to voluntarily 
donate it to the public domain. This is wholly consistent with the policy behind 
termination rights209 and is also in line with copyright’s dual goals of incentiv-
izing creation and promoting access. Importantly, rights reversion should not 
have a negative impact on artist income. Like termination rights, rights rever-
sion would kick in at a point for which the present value is zero (or very close 
to it) for most works. 
d. Use It or Lose It 
Our analysis further suggests that copyright should only afford protection 
to actively exploited works. The idea here is that works deemed to have some 
remaining commercial value will be used, licensed, and built upon (both by the 
copyright owner and by licensed users), while those that have largely exhausted 
their earnings potential—or never exhibited earnings potential to begin with—
will enter the public domain. In his work responding to Professor Nordhaus’s 
patent scholarship, economist F.M. Scherer proposed a variation of this con-
cept, calling for a patent holder to “show[] why his patent should not expire or 
be licensed at modest royalties to all applicants three or five years after its is-
sue.”210 And Landes and Posner’s proposal for a system of indefinite renewals 
turns precisely on an expectation of use.211 
Information goods deemed to have value enduring beyond the initial five- 
to ten-year copyright term might signal their continuing commercial potential—
and justify continued copyright protection—by filing a continued use exten-
sion. This showing of active exploitation would allow for differentiation and 
reward of particularly successful works. This extension, or renewal, also works 
to separate valuable from less valuable works early on, thereby avoiding what is 
sometimes referred to as “copyright clutter”—the use of older, unutilized, and 
underexploited works to threaten infringement suits against contemporary, 
highly successful works.212 
A recent example of copyright clutter is a suit brought by the trustee for 
Randy Wolfe’s estate alleging infringement of his band’s song, Taurus, by Led 
 
209.  Title 17, Chapter 2, Section 203(a)(3) of the U.S. Code permits an author to terminate the transfer 
of their copyright thirty-five years from the date of assignment. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). The termination right 
was also premised on giving authors a second bite at the apple.  
210.  F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. 
REV. 422, 427 (1972). 
211.  See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 517–18. 
212.  The notion of copyright clutter was exacerbated by the elimination of laches as a defense to 
copyright claims. See Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 677 (2014). 
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Zeppelin’s hit Stairway to Heaven.213 In that case, Randy Wolfe has passed away 
and can no longer be personally incentivized to create new music. The suit ar-
guably serves primarily to capitalize on the track’s ongoing copyright protection 
by rent seeking on Led Zeppelin’s success. This approach has been roundly 
rejected. On appeal from a panel opinion finding in favor of Wolfe’s estate, an 
amicus brief filed jointly by the Recording Industry Association of America and 
the National Music Publishers Association—two notably pro-copyright organ-
izations—warns that “[c]omposers’ intellectual property must be protected, but 
new songs incorporating new artistic expression influenced by unprotected, 
pre-existing thematic ideas must also be allowed. The panel opinion badly over-
protects. . . .”214 
Furthermore, the notion of a use requirement is consistent with the ap-
proach taken in trademark law. In order to qualify for federal trademark pro-
tection, a mark must be shown to be “use[d] in commerce.”215 The same must 
be shown upon renewal of a trademark. The Lanham Act defines “use in com-
merce” to mean “the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, 
and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.”216 The rationales behind the 
use requirement in trademark are as follows: first, use builds public recognition 
of a mark and works to identify and distinguish the good, thereby justifying 
trademark protection in order to preserve the public reputation affiliated with 
the mark (and to avoid confusion with other marks).217 Second, requiring not 
just registration but also use minimizes rent seeking.218 Otherwise, for example, 
a firm might attempt to register all of the names that its competitors might want 
to use and then simply squat on them. The latter justification is also applicable 
in the copyright context. 
In addition to bringing copyright in line with trademark, a use requirement 
might also reduce copyright law’s hostility toward derivative works, better align-
ing its protections with those of patent law. Doing so may work in furtherance 
of copyright’s incentivization goals. In his work on the law of improvements, 
Lemley writes: 
Comparing the treatment of improvers under patent and copyright law leads 
to a rather surprising result: copyright law is significantly more hostile to im-
provements than is patent law. What is surprising is not so much that the rules 
differ, but the way in which they differ. Copyright is traditionally thought to 
afford weaker, not stronger, protection than patent law, in part to compensate 
for the fact that copyrights are so much easier to obtain than patents and last 
 
213.  Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018). 
214.  Brief Amici Curiae of the Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. & the Nat’l Music Publishers Ass’n in 
Support of Defendants-Appellees on En Banc Rehearing at 2, Led Zeppelin, 905 F.3d 1116 (Nos. 16-56057 & 
16-56287) (emphasis omitted). 
215.  Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
216.  Id. 
217.  See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 
30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 282 (1987). 
218.  Id. at 281. 
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so much longer. But in the context of improvements, the opposite result ob-
tains.219 
Finally, and as discussed in Part III.B.1.c, where an intermediary copyright 
owner220 cannot show continued use of an information good—i.e., where the 
work is deemed to be past the point of commercial viability—an alternative to 
copyright termination might be to allow for automatic reversion of the copy-
right to the author. This would allow the author an opportunity to make further 
or incremental use of her work, while also avoiding any conflict with the Berne 
Convention, which takes no issue with reversion to authors. 
In fact, most continental European countries’ copyright laws include a var-
iation of the “duty to exploit” in exchange for copyright protection. Dutch law, 
for example, allows an author to “dissolve the contract wholly or in part if the 
other party to the contract does not sufficiently exploit the copyright to the 
work within a reasonable period after having concluded the contract, or does 
not sufficiently exploit the copyright after having initially performed acts of ex-
ploitation.”221  
France similarly recognizes the importance of ensuring that a work is ex-
ploited in order to earn protection. Under the French regime, “[f]ailure to pub-
lish the work within a certain time, or to pursue the exploitation of the rights in 
a consistent manner (exploitation permanente et suivie), or to reissue a book that has 
gone out of print, will result in reversion of print or electronic rights to the 
author.”222 German law is similar to that of the Netherlands, imposing a duty 
to exploit in recognition of the fact that “non-use causes serious injury to the 







219.  Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1029 
(1997) (footnotes omitted) (citing John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 CHI. L. REV. 119, 
180–81 (1991)). 
220.  I.e., a record label, a book publisher, a film studio, or another third party to whom the creator 
assigned her original copyright. 
221.  Wet auteurscontractenrecht van 30 juni 2015 [Copyright Contract Act of June 30, 2015], Stb. 
2015, 257, art. 25e translated in New Copyright Contract Law in the Netherlands, VISSER SCHAAP & KREIJGER, 
http://www.ipmc.nl/en/topics/new-copyright-contract-law-netherlands [https://perma.cc/U8G6-WU5M] 
(amending the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912). Translation of Dutch Copyright Act of 1912, as amended, is 
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222.  Jane C. Ginsburg & Pierre Sirinelli, Private International Law Aspects of Authors’ Contracts: The Dutch 
and French Examples, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 171, 175–76 (2015) (referring to French Code of Intellectual 
Property arts. L131-2 to -4, L131-6, L132-17-1 et seq.). 
223.  GIUSEPPINA D’AGOSTINO, COPYRIGHT, CONTRACTS, CREATORS: NEW MEDIA, NEW RULES 
127–28 (2010) (referencing GCA art. 41(1)); see also Martin Senftleben, More Money for Creators and More Support 
for Copyright in Society—Fair Remuneration Rights in Germany and the Netherlands, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 413, 422–
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2. For Users & Society 
Even where a work appears to have depleted its commercial value, a copy-
right owner might want to continue its copyright protection just in case—after 
all, once a work has been produced and registered, continued protection is cost-
less to the rights holder. Unfortunately, this costlessness does not extend to the 
public.224 
a. Orphaned and Mismanaged Works 
“Orphan works” are a good example of the cost disparity for lengthy cop-
yright protection as between rights holders and users. An orphan work is a work 
whose author is unknown and/or unidentifiable. One of the primary concerns 
with orphan works is that risk-averse users may avoid reworking or borrowing 
from such works: they don’t know who to approach for a license, and they 
worry about the consequences of unauthorized use should an author surface in 
the future with allegations of copyright infringement. From a policy perspec-
tive, orphan works signal a failure of the copyright system as they discourage 
both use and distribution. 
The longer a copyright lasts, the more likely a work is to become orphaned 
(as the rights holder dies, loses interest, etc.). For this reason, extended copy-
right duration is often associated with an increase in orphan works over time. 
Again, just because continuing copyright beyond the point of commercial value 
is costless to, for example, a record label that has stopped earning on a title does 
not mean it is costless to society as a whole. 
The fact that copyright’s term often outlives the author can also lead to 
prohibitive transaction costs for works that may not be technically orphaned 
but rather mismanaged by their living stewards. As Eva Subotnik has explained: 
 Creators often come across earlier works that they would like to use in 
their own works—uses for which, depending on the circumstances, they 
would seek authorization and be willing to pay a reasonable license fee. Over 
time, tracing the chain of copyright title from the author to its present owners 
can make such an endeavor time-consuming, expensive, and fraught with un-
certainty. For example, because of the fundamental distinction between a cop-
yright in the intangible work of authorship and an ownership right in a partic-
ular copy of the work, a documentary filmmaker can lawfully purchase a 
photograph but still not be able to use it in his film because he has not ob-
tained permission from the copyright owner. As search costs become unrea-
sonably high, they may give rise to market failures if the filmmaker forgoes 
use of what might be a contextually valuable image. Over time, the public may 
suffer because of such artistic compromises or, at the very least, because of 
delays in bringing such subsequent uses to market. 
 
224.  For a general discussion of the problem, see generally Molly S. Van Houweling, Disciplining the 
Dead Hand of Copyright: Durational Limits on Remote Control Property, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (SPECIAL SYMP.) 53 
(2017). 
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 It is possible that the postmortem term raises these costs. While an author 
is still alive, he may be able to direct the filmmaker to the current rights holder 
even if the author long ago assigned these rights away. By contrast, upon the 
author’s death, and over the ensuing decades, the availability of information 
required to trace the chain of title to the copyright often lessens. It therefore 
may become more difficult for the good-faith user to track down the current 
owner.225 
The briefs from Eldred v. Reno offer additional uses that might benefit from 
a shorter copyright duration: for example, a choir director with limited funds 
who relies on public-domain works for her members to perform; a film-resto-
ration company that seeks to preserve and restore old movies with deteriorating 
physical film and that have been either orphaned or abandoned; and a book 
publisher that reprints public-domain books that would otherwise be out-of-
print and thus accessible to no one.226 In short, one significant benefit of a 
shorter copyright duration is greater access to works that might not otherwise 
be accessible. 
b. Disadvantaged Groups & Marginalized Works 
Works produced by marginalized or disadvantaged authors offer another 
example of cost disparity arising from lengthy copyright protection. In the same 
way that a lengthy term of copyright protection allows time for a larger number 
of works to become orphaned, it can also lead to a greater number of aban-
doned and neglected works; rights holders lose interest post-commercialization, 
while prospective users are nonetheless prohibited from reworking or otherwise 
utilizing the works. This neglect can lead to works that are “disappeared” for 
all intents and purposes, a phenomenon that poses a particular threat for mar-
ginalized and disadvantaged groups. As explained by Tony Reese: 
[W]orks created by authors who belong to marginalized groups may not 
find a wide audience or commercial success when they are published. But in a 
later era, these works may be valuable documents for understanding the mar-
ginalization and oppression that the authors and others felt, and how they 
experienced it, survived, and pushed forward. For all these reasons, keeping 
creative works alive will give future audiences a broad range of authorship 
from which to choose in their reading, viewing, and listening.227 
A powerful example of this concern lies at the intersection of orphan and 
marginalized works. In a hearing before the House Subcommittee on Courts, 
the Internet, and Intellectual Property, counsel for the United States Holocaust 
 
225.  Eva E. Subotnik, Copyright and the Living Dead?: Succession Law and the Postmortem Term, 29 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 77, 117–18 (2015) (footnotes omitted). 
226.  See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judg-
ment at 15–18, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. 1:99CV00065 JLG). 
227.  R. Anthony Reese, What Copyright Owes the Future, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 287, 291 (2012). 
404 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2:351 
Memorial Museum testified about, among other things, having recently ac-
quired a diary written by a young Polish girl who did not survive the Holocaust. 
In order to display the work, the museum had to clear the copyright, but it was 
unable to locate any surviving family members or heirs.228 Further, in the music 
context, many musicians of color were historically excluded from registering 
with performance-rights organizations229—the entities that collect royalties on 
the part of music-composition owners—and so were less likely than white mu-
sicians to register their copyrights. 
3. For Legislators 
Finally, our analysis may impact policy makers. An example is the recently 
passed MMA, signed into law on October 11, 2018.230 The legislation, which 
passed unanimously in both the House and the Senate, was actually a compila-
tion of three separate bills, one of which was the CPA Act.231 As discussed, the 
CPA Act aimed to bring recording artists who released songs prior to 1972 into 
the digital fold so that they could begin earning digital public-performance roy-
alties on par with artists whose work was released after 1972. 
Of the three separate acts that comprised the MMA, the CPA Act faced 
the most controversy. In addition to an overarching skepticism about the ability 
of retroactive rights granting to incentivize creation, criticism of the Act fo-
cused on three primary concerns. First, by setting the term to end in 2067, the 
Act introduces protection disparity between sound recordings and musical 
compositions and between pre- and post-1972 sound recordings. Second, the 
Act removes pre-1972 sound recordings from the various exemptions applica-
ble to all post-1972 recordings under extant copyright law. And finally, the Act 
establishes a new federal regime directly in conflict with the common law of 
several states.232 Perhaps the most significant critique of the CPA Act focused 
on its half-baked effort to compensate pre-1972 recording artists, namely, that 
it introduced a digital royalty requirement for digital and satellite services but 
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not for terrestrial radio (wherein services still do not pay recording artists from 
any era).233 
Our findings regarding the commercial half-life of music—that it is, on av-
erage, significantly shorter than the current copyright term—suggest that the 
critics may have been on to something. Specifically, the CPA Act can only hope 
to benefit a very small number of superstar works that still exhibit commercial 
value after many years. For the overwhelming majority of works, the CPA Act 
does nothing other than impose additional cost on the public domain without 
conferring equivalent (or, in most cases, any) value on the owners of those 
works. As stated by Sirius XM’s CEO Jim Meyer in defense of the company’s 
rejection of the original version of the Act: “If Congress truly wants to correct 
an unfairness in the Copyright Act, terrestrial radio should be subject to the 
[Act] just like satellite and internet radio.”234 Indeed, the CPA Act also denies 
pre-1972 recording artists the benefit of a termination right available to their 
contemporary counterparts, raising further questions regarding its purported 
benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
The advent of streaming has extended the period of commercial viability 
for some information goods, perhaps even blurring what used to be a clear line 
between frontline and catalog.235 As more data becomes available, we hope to 
get a clearer picture of what this impact looks like. In the meantime, the strong-
est implication of our analysis on copyright’s utility over time is that (notwith-
standing over a century of debate to the contrary) copyright’s duration is in fact 
not central to the optimization of copyright’s protection for most commercial 
information goods. 
With the average information good earning the substantial portion of its 
lifetime revenues in the first five to ten years following release (and often far 
more rapidly than even that), there is often little benefit to the average copyright 
owner for protection beyond that point. Assuming commercial interest mirrors 
consumer interest more broadly, there is most likely little benefit to users for 
access beyond that point.236 This all suggests that advocates’ time and energy 
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could be more productively spent elsewhere. One possibility for redirection of 
legislative and scholarly time and energy is on the appropriate strength of cop-
yright protections. These might include introduction of dynamic protection, 
differential terms, rights reversion, and a use requirement. 
